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INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. OBLIGATIONS TOWARD
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The day was Sunday, June 4, 1939, when a German Liner, the St.
Louis, cruised off Miami Beach. On board were 907 Jewish
refugees from Nazi Germany. The ship was surrounded by vessels
of the U.S. Coast Guard to prevent any attempts by the refugees to
reach the shore, and also to rescue any attempted suicides. The
crew and refugees were waiting for a decision by President
Roosevelt on their request for political asylum. The request was
refused and the ship returned to Europe. The German captain,
more humanitarian than the President of the United States,
allowed them to land in Holland, Belgium, France, and Britain.
A year later, the Nazis invaded Holland, Belgium, and France
and half of the refugees died in concentration camps.'
A stowaway2 asylum seeker denied an adequate opportunity to
assert her claim can be returned to her country of origin where she
may then face persecution and death, suffering a fate similar to that
t B.A. 1988, Harvard College; M.A. Foreign Affairs 1989, University of Virginia;
J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to
Ausma Grimes, Kim Pham Trang, and my parents, all inspirational refugees, and to
John Short. Many thanks to Fernando Chang-Muy andJeffDillman, for sparking my
interest in stowaways, and to Professors Roger Clark, David Martin, and Gerry
Neuman, for kindling this interest with their insightful commentary. The time and
support of Alexei Cowett, Teri Firmiss, Larry Frankel, Felicia Listwa, and Blake
Rhodes was also much appreciated.
1 Haitian Detention and Interdiction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciaty, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 122 (1989) [hereinafter Haitian Interdiction Hearing] (statement of Msgr. Bryan
0. Walsh, Executive Director, Catholic Community Services).
2 While stowaways also arrive on airplanes, this Comment addresses the problems
specific to shipboard stowaways. Since 1989, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) has classified "as a stowaway any alien who lacks proof that he or she
was admitted on an airplane and paid for the flight." LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTs, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE 80 (1990) [hereinafter A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE]. Significantly, vessel
and airplane stowaways are in very different situations upon their arrival in the
United States. Airline carriers usually detain aliens classified as stowaways at hotels
near the airport. See e.g., id. at 80-81. Because airplanes must immediately be
readied for use by other passengers, it is not feasible to detain stowaways on board.
Vessel stowaways, on the other hand, are not routinely permitted off their vessels;
they are detained on board until return transportation can be arranged.
(285)
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of the St. Louis passengers. Though many will escape death, often
"stowaway asylum-seekers have been confined for many weeks and
even months on board ship travelling from one port to another."
Because records are incomplete, 4 it is impossible to determine how
many stowaways are landing in the United States or to trace the
ultimate fate of those rejected at the border. It is known that
between 1892 and 1988, 16,300 stowaways were apprehended and
excluded, or rejected. 5 This number, however, obviously does not
include those who evaded inspection or who were granted asylum.
This Comment addresses protection issues pertaining to stow-
away asylum seekers. Section I discusses their treatment under
United States law. Section II sets forth the problems with current
shipboard screening procedures for stowaways, focusing on access
to interpreters (II.B.1) and counsel (II.B.4) and on the obstacles
during shipboard interviews of official bias (II.B.2.a) and asylum
seeker reticence (II.B.2.b). These procedures are also compared to
those used in the Haitian interdiction program (II.B.3). This
section argues that, contrary to current practice, all stowaways
should be automatically removed from their vessels and granted a
hearing, or at least be granted access to an interpreter and to any
counsel present. Section III details the involvement of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)6 in U.S.
3 Note on Stowaway Asylum-Seekers, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 39th Sess., at 1,
U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/51 (1988) [hereinafter Stowaway Asylum-Seekers]. The Executive
Committee noted further that "[i]n one instance, the individual concerned was kept
on board for well over a year." Id.; see also On a Bahamas Cruise With No Way Ashore,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1987, at A13 ("Eight stowaways have been riding the high seas
in a legal muddle, stuck for six days on a cruise ship that makes daily round trips
between Miami and the Bahamas.").
4 See Robert M. Jarvis, Rusting in Dydock: Stowaways, Shipowners and the
Administrative Penalty Provision of INA Section 273(d), 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 25, 48 n.115
(1988) (asserting that "[iut has never been possible to knowjust how many stowaways
actually are landing in the United States"); see also infra note 258 (describing the
difficulties in ascertaining the number of stowaways that arrive at U.S. shores).
5 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1988 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 111 (1989).
6 The UNHCR was established in 1951 to assist those displaced by World War II.
Its mandate is to protect refugees and to find durable solutions for them through
voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in a third country. The High
Commissioner, both as a person and as an agency, "stands at the center of the
structure of refugee protection and care." W.R. SMYSER, REFUGEES: EXTENDED EXILE
42 (1987). The agency now "occupies the wings of two large Geneva office buildings,
has 80 delegates in offices around the world, and employs more than 1,500 regular
staff personnel." Id.; see also infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text (discussing
the status of the UNHCR under international law).
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stowaway cases and suggests possible improvements in this interven-
tion. Section IV then discusses the rights of appeal available to
stowaways. Section V assesses the impact of the suggested changes
on current U.S. immigration procedures.
The Comment continues with a discussion in section VI of how
the United States, once it implemented progressive measures toward
stowaway asylum seekers, could then pressure other nations to
assume similar obligations, for stowaways are a worldwide problem
and an international responsibility. Subsection VI.A describes the
dormant International Convention Relating to Stowaways and
maintains that the United States could take the lead in securing
international commitment to assisting stowaways by initiating the
drafting of a new and more comprehensive International Conven-
tion Relating to Stowaways, and by backing its ratification. In
subsection VI.B the special obligations that port states bear toward
stowaways are outlined; subsection VI.C discusses the international
role of the UNHCR in protecting stowaways; and subsection VI.D
highlights the heightened duties that the international community
owes to child stowaway asylum seekers. The conclusion sets forth
possible amendments to U.S. and international stowaway procedures
that incorporate the solutions suggested in the previous sections.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW REGARDING
STOWAWAY ASYLUM SEEKERS
A. Stowaways as an Excludable Class under Immigration Law
Through the Immigration Act of 1917, stowaways became
excludable 7 from admission into the United States, but the Secre-
tary of Labor was given discretionary power to admit them if they
were "otherwise admissible."8 As a result of the Act, 13,755 stow-
aways were excluded between 1921 and 1950. 9 Even so, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) 1948 Annual Report
listed stowaways as "one of the five major causes of an unusually
7 Aliens apprehended at the border are placed into exclusion proceedings whereas
aliens who have entered the United States (either legally or illegally) are entitled to
deportation proceedings.
8 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876 (codified at INA
§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988)). To avoid complication, all immigration statutes will
be referred to in the text by their INA (Immigration and Nationality Act) sections.
A parallel citation to the United States Code will be included in the footnotes.
9 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 5, at 111.
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heavy work load" and maintained that "'legislation to authorize
stowaways being detained on board and deported without ...
hearings would make for better law enforcement and conservation
of manpower.'
10
In light of the INS's concern, Congress included stowaways
among those aliens excludable under the 1951 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)." The legislative history of the Act ex-
plained that "[s]towaways are excluded absolutely, whereas at
present, the Attorney General has discretionary authority to admit
stowaways." 12 Not only did the new INA eliminate the Attorney
General's discretion in admitting stowaways, but it included provi-
sions that denied stowaways the right to a hearing before a special
inquiry officer13 and the right to appeal an exclusion decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 14 the highest administra-
tive immigration forum.
15
1O SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1950)
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 1515] (quoting INS, ANNUAL REPORT 9, 27 (1948)); see also
Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws: Joint Hearings on S. 716,
H.R. 2379, H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomms. of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 165 (1951) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Richard Arens, staff
director of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary) (asking why it is "that the stowaway problem is one of
the five greatest problems of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the
present time").
11 SeeINA § 212(a)(18), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(18) (1988) ("[T]he following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into
the United States:... (18) Aliens who are stowaways."). This provision was reenacted
in the Immigration Act of 1990, which states that "[a]ny alien who is a stowaway is
excludable." Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a)(6)(D), 104 Stat.
5073 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). The new section applies to "individuals
entering the United States on or afterJune 1, 1991." Id. § 601(e), 104 Stat. at 5077.
12 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1703.
13 The term "specdal inquiry officer" is synonymous with "immigrationjudge." See
8 C.F.R. § 1.1(l) (1991). Immigration judges comprise one section of the Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which operates within the Justice Department,
apart from INS. The EOIR is directly accountable to the Associate Attorney General.
14 The BIA is a five-member body which, along with the corps of immigration
judges, makes up the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) in the Justice
Department. The BIA primarily hears appeals from the exclusion and deportation
decisions of immigration judges.
15 See INA § 273(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(d) (1988). This section also imposed fines
on carriers who failed to detain a stowaway aboard or who did not remove from the
United States a stowaway on whom an exclusion order had been imposed. SeeJarvis,
supra note 4, at 34 ("For many members of Congress, section 273(d) represented a
means of deterring stowaways by regulating unscrupulous as well as careless
shipowners."); Mary Mason, Alien Stowaways, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
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It is revealing to compare the procedures afforded stowaways
with those applied to other aliens. Section 235 of the INA grants
immigration officers the authority to inspect all aliens seeking
admission into the United States and to determine whether the alien
is entitled to enter.1 6 INA § 235(b) mandates that "every alien...
except as otherwise provided in... [section] 273(d), who may not
appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival
to be... entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry to be
conducted by a special inquiry officer."17 Under INA § 236(a), a
special inquiry officer is granted "the authority in any case to
determine whether an arriving alien who has been detained for
further inquiry under section 235 shall be allowed to enter or shall
be excluded and deported."18 Furthermore, an alien normally has
the right to appeal a special inquiry officer's exclusion decision to
the BIA. 19
With respect to stowaways, however, INA § 273(d) explicitly
states that "[t]he provisions of section 235 for detention of aliens
for examination before special inquiry officers and the right of
appeal provided for in section 236 shall not apply to aliens who
arrive as stowaways and no such alien shall be permitted to land in
the United States." 20 In sum, stowaways are summarily excludable
under INA § 212(a)(18) and are denied permission to land under
INA § 273(d).
Although the INA does not define the term stowaway, a
workable definition can be found in the statute that criminalizes
stowing away, 18 U.S.C. § 219921 (entitled "Stowaways on vessels
and aircraft"). This statute classifies as a stowaway anyone who,
and Shipowners, 12 TUL. MAR. LJ. 361, 365 (1988) (noting that § 273(d) "specifically
refer[s] to the duties [of shipowners] which are triggered by the discovery of an alien
stowaway"); see also CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 3 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 9.13 (1991) (stating that the failure to detain stowaways aboard until inspection
triggers an absolute liability in that the carrier will be subject to penalties "even
though it had no knowledge of the stowaway's presence until he was apprehended in
the United States ... [and] even though every precaution was taken" (footnote
omitted)).
16 See INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1988).
17 Id. § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
18 Id. § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b).
19 See id. § 236(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) ("From a decision of a special inquiry officer
excluding an alien, such alien may take a timely appeal to the Attorney General
.... "). Recall that the BIA operates under the auspices of the Attorney General. See
supra notes 13-14.
20 INA § 273(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(d) (1988).
21 18 U.S.C. § 2199 (1988).
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"without the consent of the owner ... or person in command of any
vessel.... [and] with intent to obtain transportation, boards, enters
or secretes himself aboard such vessel."22 Many courts have used
this definition or a similar one requiring intent to stow away.
23
There are persuasive reasons for according stowaway asylum
seekers the right of disembarkation. When the INA was proposed,
the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers feared that
§§ 212(a)(18) and 273(d) "did not allow full and fair hearings for
stowaways and vested judicial or quasi judicial powers 'in the
prosecutor or the immigration policemen.'" 24 When they are not
permitted ashore stowaways essentially become prisoners aboard
their vessels and face a high risk of being returned to persecution.
Thus, "although limited in overall numbers, [they] constitute a
major protection concern [for the UNHCR]." 25 It is, therefore,
important to assess whether the United States is satisfying its
obligations toward stowaway asylum seekers.
B. United States Obligations Toward Asylum Seekers
Juxtaposed against the limited rights of stowaways is the United
States obligation, under treaty and statute, of non-refoulement. By
ratifying the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
26
22 Id. This provision imposes a fine of "not more than $1,000 or imprison[ment]
not more than one year, or both" for stowing away. Id. However, "only a very small
percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or expected to lead to criminal
prosecutions." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984). The INS mainly
focuses its attention on the removal of aliens.
23 See United States ex rel. Candreva v. Smith, 27 F.2d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 1928)
(defining stowaway as "one who conceals himself aboard an outgoing vessel for the
purpose of obtaining free passage"); United States ex rel. D'Amato v. Williams, 193
F. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (defining a stowaway as "one who steals his passage"); In
re M/V "South African Victory," 12 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (B.I.A. 1967) (finding
longshoremen who boarded vessel in search of food and then fell asleep not to be
stowaways); In re S.S. Maria Angela Martinoli, 1961 American Maritime Cases 1581
(B.I.A. 1960) (holding that a longshoreman who accidently fell asleep aboard a vessel
was not a stowaway because of a lack of necessary intent to remain aboard); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1421 (6th ed. 1990) (defining stowaway as "[o]ne who
conceals himself aboard an out-going vessel or aircraft for the purpose of obtaining
free passage").
2TS. REP. No. 1515, supra note 10, at 366 (quoting testimony of a representative
of the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers).
25 Stowaway Asylum-Seekers, supra note 3, at 1; ef. 2 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 298 (1990)
(reprinting a resolution of the General Assembly wherein particular concern for the
safety and welfare of stowaway asylum seekers is expressed).
26 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The United States acceded to the 1967
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which incorporates the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 27 the United States agreed to abide by Article 33 of the
1951 Convention. This Article states that "[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee ... to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion."
28
The Refugee Act of 1980,29 obligated the Attorney General to
Protocol on November 1, 1968. See M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL
TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 307 (1984) (volume updated annually).
27 See 1967 Protocol, supra note 26, art. I, para. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S.
at 268.
28 1951 Convention Relatingto the Status ofRefugees,July28,1951,189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. Another treaty that prevents the United States
from returning people to persecution is the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M.
1027, 24 I.L.M. 535 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (adopted by U.N. General
Assembly as G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 99, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984)). The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention on October 27,
1990. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Legislation
implementing the Torture Convention is pending in Congress. It is part of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991. See 137 CONG. REG. S3209, S3237 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 1991).
Article I of the Torture Convention defines torture as "any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
.. when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official." Torture Convention, supra, 23 I.L.M.
at 1027. Paragraph I of Article 3 is critical in the refugee context. It mandates that
"[n]o State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger ofbeing
subjected to torture." Id. at 1028. Paragraph 2 clarifies that "[flor the purpose of
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take
into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in
the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights." Id. Therefore, if a stowaway alleges that she fled from a country with
a poor human rights record, the authorities must investigate to determine if there are
substantial grounds for believing the stowaway could be subject to torture if denied
entry into the United States.
29 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.). This Act was the implementation mechanism for United States obligations
under the 1967 Protocol. The Act was hailed for establishing "a permanent and
systematic procedure for meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees and those
seeking asylum in the United States." 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (1981). The House Report
stated that the Act was establishing "for the first time a provision in Federal law
specifically relating to asylum" so as "to insure a fair and workable asylum policy
which is consistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other
nations and with our obligations under international law." HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 608,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18
(1979).
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establish a procedure for an alien ... at a land border or port of
entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and
the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney
General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).30
This Act's definition of "refugee" tracked the language of the
1951 Convention. A refugee is defined as any person who has "a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."3 1 A corps of specially trained asylum officers has initial
jurisdiction over asylum applications "filed by an alien physically
present in the United States or seeking admission at a port of
entry."
3 2
Once exclusion or deportation proceedings33  have com-
menced, asylum claims are considered to be requests for withhold-
ing of exclusion or deportation under § 243(h) and are heard by an
immigration judge.34 If an alien initially is denied asylum by an
asylum officer, she can renew her request before an immigration
judge in the exclusion or deportation proceeding.3 5 While INA
§ 208 makes granting of asylum discretionary, INA § 243(h)
mandates withholding of deportation of refugees.3 6 Thus, both
30 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified
at INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)). An alien can apply for discretionary
asylum under § 208 if the INS has not yet initiated deportation or exclusion
proceedings against her. Once such proceedings have been initiated, her application
will automatically be considered under § 243(h). See infra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
31 Refugee Act of 1980, § 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102 (codified at INA § 101(a)(42)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1988)). For the treaty definition of "refugee," see 1951
Convention, supra note 28, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152, amended by 1967
Protocol, supra note 26, art. 1, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
32 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1991). The asylum officer position was created in July
1990. The officers are attached to the Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole
(CORAP) within the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(b) (1991).
-3 For the distinction between these proceedings, see supra note 7.
34 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1991).
35 See id.
36 Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e), 94 Stat. at 107 (codified at INA § 243(h), 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988)) ("The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien
... to a country... [where her] life or freedom would be threatened."). The Act
revised this section by imposing an obligation on the Attorney General to withhold
deportation; this had previously been left to the Attorney General's discretion. See
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976) ("The Attorney General is authorized to withhold
deportation of any alien .... ").
Another critical difference between application for asylum under § 208 and
withholding of deportation under § 243(h) is the burden of proof to be satisfied by
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treaty and statute obligate the United States to offer haven, or
asylum, to those who satisfy the refugee definition.
The disparity between INA § 273(d), requiring summary
exclusion of stowaways, and the 1967 Protocol and the Refugee Act
of 1980, mandating protection for asylum seekers, posed a dilemma
for immigration authorities. Because of the rights accorded under
the Refugee Act, stowaway asylum seekers could apply for asylum to
the district director at the port of entry.37 But while asylum
applicants generally had the right to appeal the district director's
decision to an immigration judge,3 8 INA § 273(d) denied this right
to stowaways.
3 9
In a case involving two Chinese stowaways, however, the Second
Circuit held that "the Refugee Act of 1980's asylum proceedings and
[INA § 273(d)] can be reconciled by allowing stowaways a hearing
limited to the asylum claim, followed by whatever other procedural
rights other asylum applicants are afforded." 40 By limiting the
hearing to the issue of asylum eligibility, the court reasoned that it
was "preserv[ing] the basic thrust of [INA § 273(d)'s] command that
stowaways are not entitled to exclusion hearings." 4 1 The BIA
refused to apply this case outside the Second Circuit, asserting that
because stowaways are not entitled to an exclusion hearing, neither
the immigration judge nor the Board had authority to consider a
renewed application for asylum after a district director passed
judgment on it.42 Two California district courts, however, did
the applicant. Those who can show a "well-founded fear of persecution" are eligible
for asylum under § 208. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-50 (1987).
To qualify for the mandatory relief under § 243(h), the alien must demonstrate clear
probability ("more likely than not") that she would be subject to persecution. See INS
v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
37 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (1990); see also A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE, supra note 2,
at 77-78 (noting that "[t]he INS has taken the position that aliens who stow away on
U.S. vessels and who claim asylum when they are discovered by the crew may apply
for asylum at the vessel's first United States port of call").
38 See supra text accompanying notes 13, 17-18.
39 See supra text accompanying note 20.
40 Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1983).
41 Id. at 876. The court based its decision on United States treaty obligations
toward asylum applicants, the Refugee Act of 1980, and a procedural due process
"interest in not being returned" to persecution. See id. at 877.
42 See In re Waldei, 19 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 1984). This case dealt with
an Ethiopian stowaway who was denied asylum by the local district director. After
this denial, the director instituted exclusion proceedings against the stowaway. The
confusion in stowaway procedures even amongINS officials is evidenced by the BIA's
statement that "[t]he applicant, as an entrant stowaway, was not entitled to an
exclusion hearingbefore an immigrationjudge and was therefore improperly placed
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follow the Second Circuit, granting stowaways the right to appeal
their asylum claim to an immigration judge.
43
In jurisdictions influenced by the BIA's reasoning, a stowaway
was not entitled to appeal the district director's initial decision on
her asylum claim and, thus, was not permitted to disembark from
the vessel.44 The stowaway asylum seeker could leave the vessel
only through a habeas corpus proceeding
4 5 in district court,46
in exclusion proceedings by the Service." Id.
Our immigration system is so complicated that a federal circuitjudge declared
that "[w]hatever guidance the regulations furnish to those cognoscenti familiar with
[immigration] procedures, this court, despite many years of legal experience, finds
that they yield up meaning only grudgingly and that morsels of comprehension must
be pried from mollusks ofjargon." Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909, 919 (5th
Cir. 1981), quoted in T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKoFF & DAviD A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION:
PROCESS AND POLICY xviii (1985).
43 See Guo-Jun Cheng v. Ilchert, 698 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fang-Sui Yau
v. Gustafson, 623 F. Supp. 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
44 See, e.g., Yiu Sing Chun, 708 F.2d at 871 ("While their applications [for asylum]
were considered [by the San Francisco district director, before the vessel came within
the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit,] the [stowaways] were confined on the
'American Lark,' en route to New York by way of Panama and Savannah, Georgia
... ."). It was only when the stowaways reached New York that they were permitted
to leave the vessel. See id.; see also Young Stowaways Ask Asylum From Ethiopia, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1983, at B2 (noting that after initially being denied asylum in New
York, two teenage stowaways traveled to numerous U.S. ports before finally being
disembarked upon the vessel's return to New York).
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed.
1990) ("The primary function of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to release from
unlawful imprisonment.").
46 See INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1988) ("[A]ny alien against whom a final
order of exclusion has been made ... under ... section 236 of this Act ... may
obtain judicial review of such order by habeas corpus proceedings and not
otherwise."). Although stowaways are excluded pursuant to INA § 273(d), not INA
§ 236, "the clear intent of Congress in passing [INA § 106(b)] was to make petitions
for habeas corpus the sole procedure for testing all decisions to exclude aliens,
including those who are stowaways." Garcia v. Smith, 674 F.2d 838, 840 n.1 (11th
Cir.) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus
petition of a stowaway asylum seeker who had been excluded by the district director),
modified on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982); see also HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT-AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No.
1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2974
("[H]abeas corpus shall be the sole and exclusive method for judicial review of an
order excluding an alien from admission into the United States.").
It is well established that physical presence in the United States, "even under
shipboard detention in the territorial waters, is sufficient to support the application
of the constitutionally grounded writ of habeas corpus." David A. Martin, Due Process
and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV. 165, 179 (1983). Although the United States has not ratified the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that the territorial sea can extend to
12 nautical miles from the baseline, see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
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which, in turn, could be initiated only after the district director's
issuance of a final exclusion order.
4 7
When ruling on a habeas petition, a court will consider "whether
the statute, regulations, and the constitutional requirements of due
process were observed, and whether the agency's action was
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion."48 A federal court
in habeas corpus proceedings can then issue "an order permitting
the stowaway to leave the vessel to develop an asylum claim and may
also issue an injunction preventing the stowaway from being
transferred or removed [from its jurisdiction] during the pendency
of the asylum case."
49
Nevertheless, the availability of habeas relief for a stowaway
asylum seeker is far from certain. It depends entirely upon whether
the stowaway can secure counsel to draft and file the petition, a
difficult task given "the brief period that a vessel is usually in
port."50 The vessel authorities will not delay departure to give the
10, 1982, pt. II, § 2, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272 [hereinafter Sea Convention],
President Reagan extended the U.S. territorial sea claim from three to twelve miles
on December 27, 1988. See Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1988). Therefore,
stowaways aboard vessels within twelve miles of the U.S. baseline can file for habeas
corpus.
While habeas corpus is the only other legal means for a stowaway to leave a
vessel if she is not initially permitted to disembark, she can escape from the vessel
and swim to shore, entering the United States illegally. In this situation, the stowaway
would have to be removed through deportation, not exclusion, proceedings because
she has already entered the United States. See In re A-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 356, 361
(B.IA. 1961) (stating that a stowaway who escaped through porthole and swam to
shore was entitled to deportation proceedings because she effected entry into the
United States). Attempts by stowaways to swim ashore are not uncommon. See, e.g.,
Four Iranian Stowaways Jump From a Ship Into New York Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1987, § 1, at 20 ("Four Iranians, stowaways on a freighter bound for Newark from
Istanbul, were pulled from New York Harbor... after they jumped from the ship
.... "); U.S. Recommends Denial ofAsylumforSyrian, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1985, at A23
("The State Department recommended.., that asylum be denied to a Syrian ship
stowaway who jumped handcuffed into the Mississippi River .... ").
47 See INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1988). The filing of a habeas claim does
not hinge on whether a stowaway has already applied for asylum. Once a stowaway's
presence is known to the INS, and before the stowaway even applies for asylum, a
district director could summarily issue an exclusion order under INA § 212(a)(18),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(18) (1988). Therefore, the issuance of a final exclusion order does
not necessarily mean that an asylum determination has already been made by the
district director.
48 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE: PRACTICE AND STRATEGY § 30.06[l][c]
(Gittel Gordon & Charles Gordon eds., rev. ed. 1991).
49 p. Patrick Murphy & Arthur R. Amdur, Crewmen, Passengers and OtherSojourners:
Part I, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 1990, at 22.
50 Id.
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attorney an opportunity to file a habeas petition on behalf of the
stowaway. Moreover, under INA § 106(c), an exclusion order "shall
not be reviewed [through habeas proceedings] by any court if [the
alien] has departed from the United States after the issuance of the
order."'1
A procedure in which the stowaway asylum seeker's rights
depended on the fortuitous circumstances of the jurisdiction where
the vessel landed and the availability of pro bono counsel hardly
satisfied the United States obligation to those fearing persecution.
In recognition of this, the INS promulgated a new rule regarding
stowaway asylum seekers in the belief that this rule would "facilitate
the adjudication of claims for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion in a manner consistent with the Refugee Act of 1980.
" 52
II. THE 1990 RULE ADDRESSING STOWAWAY ASYLUM SEEKERS
AND ITS DEFICIENCIES
A. Procedures Under the 1990 Rule
The new rule revised 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) to include stowaways;
it previously addressed only alien crewmen alleging persecution.
The regulation now states that any stowaway who "alleges that he
cannot return to his country of nationality.., because of fear of
persecution ... is eligible to apply for asylum or withholding of
deportation. " 53 It mandates that "[i]f the alien is on a vessel or
other conveyance and makes such fear known to an immigration
inspector or other official making an examination on the convey-
ance, he shall be promptly removed from the conveyance." 54 The
alien must then be provided with application forms and given ten
days to file an asylum application with the local district director.
55
The director must forward this application to the local asylum
51 INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1988).
5 2 Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,679 (1990) [hereinafter New Reg.] (amending 8 C.F.R.
§ 253.1(f)).
53 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) (1991).
' Id. § 253.1(f)(1) (emphasis added).
55 See id. § 253.1(f)(2).
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officer.16 A negative decision by the asylum officer can be ap-
pealed directly to the BIA within ten days.
57
B. Problems with Shipboard Screening Procedures
1. The Necessity of an Interpreter During Initial Screening
a. The Complications of Securing Shipboard Interpreters
According to the new rule, a stowaway will be removed from the
vessel only if she "makes such fear [of persecution] known to an
immigration inspector or other official making an examination on
the conveyance." 58 It is difficult to imagine how an exhausted and
bewildered stowaway, with little or no knowledge of English, having
spent days, if not weeks, on the vessel, would spontaneously make
her fear of persecution known to an official.
The use of an interpreter would appear, at first glance, to be the
simple solution. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria forDeterminingRefugee
Status, considers access to "the services of a competent interpreter"
a fundamental. requirement for an asylum applicant.59  The
UNHCR Handbook was published as a practical guide for "[g]overn-
ment officials concerned with the determination of refugee status
in the various Contracting States." 60 It has been cited as persua-
sive authority in numerous fora, including the United States
Supreme Court.
6 1
Despite this authority, the INS has no regulation to ensure that
a stowaway will be furnished with a qualified interpreter. Frequent-
ly a member of the crew is used as a translator, although the
56 See id. The regulations created a corps of professional asylum officers "who are
to receive special training in international relations and international law." Id.
§ 208.1(b); see also supra note 32; infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing
the ossible involvement of asylum officers in stowaway cases).
7 See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4) (1991).
58 Id. § 253.1(f)(1).
5 9 
See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 1 192 (1979)
[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
60 Ghassan M. Arnaout, Foreword to UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, at 1, 2.
61 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,438-39 (1987) ("In interpreting
the Protocol definition of'refugee' we are further guided by the analysis set forth in
the [UNHCR Handbook]."); In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (B.I.A.
1980) ("The Handbook provides an interpretation of the meaning and application of
the terms used in the Protocol.").
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individual often is not fluent in English and/or the stowaway's
native language.62 Furthermore, a crewmember may speak but not
be able to read the appropriate foreign language. This problem is
critical should the stowaway have documents or identification that
would help make her fear of persecution known to the official. INS
regulations require that, in petitions or other documents submitted
with an immigration form, "[a] foreign document must be accompa-
nied by an English translation .... The translator must certify
[that] he/she is competent to translate, and that the translation is
accurate." 63 The assistance of a crewman translator in articulating
an asylum claim may be of little avail to a stowaway unable to leave
the vessel because of her inability to clarify documents that would
make her fear of persecution known to the inspecting official.
64
62 See Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir. 1983) ("When the ship
arrived in California, each [stowaway] filed a Form 1-589 applying for asylum. A
Chinese-speaking employee of the shipping line, who neither was a lawyer nor spoke
English well, helped [the stowaways] complete the forms."); Affidavit of Susan
Douglas Taylor at 1-2, Record of the Unreported Case of Xiao Guangming
[hereinafter Record] (on file with author) (stating that the Chief Officer, who acted
as the interpreter during the stowaway's interview, told the attorney that he was
Malaysian and "that though he speaks some Mandarin, he [did] not feel competent
to perform this type of interpretation"). The vessel's American shipping agent also
told the attorney that the crewman was not fluent in Mandarin and was only able to
communicate with the stowaway about basic matters and ideas. See Telephone
Interview with Susan Douglas Taylor, Attorney for Xiao Guangming (Feb. 27, 1991)
[hereinafter Taylor Interview] (interview notes on file with author). Furthermore, the
two attorneys involved interviewed the crewman interpreter and "both had great
difficulty understanding his English." Id. The attorney for the stowaway claimed that
"the entire adjudication... [was] marred by the faulty record established during [this
first] interview." Id.
Only after Xiao Guangming had spent nearly a year in detention and after his
attorney was forced to obtain a temporary restraining order staying the stowaway's
detention did the BIA grant him a new hearing before an asylum officer. See
Stowaway Gets New Hearing: Man Continues Quest for Political Asylum, SEATtLE TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1991, at B6 [hereinafter Stowaway Gets Hearing]; Chinese Stowaways Freed From
INS Detention Center, AGENCE FRANiCE PRESSE,July 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library [hereinafter Chinese Freed].
63 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (1991).
64 See, e.g., Record, supra note 62, at 3 (indicating that the stowaway's attorney,
upon asking "what translations were used by the District Director," was told that the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), the office within the
State Department that issues advisory letters on asylum applications, "probably had
a translator"). It is unlikely that the crewmember who had difficulty interpreting
during the screening interview, see supra note 62, would have been capable of
translating these documents. The attorney stated that despite numerous requests she
had "never been served with the translations of the documents which were originally
submitted, and were used by the Service in making the decision [to deny asylum] in
this case." Record, supra note 62, at 4.
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Given these problems, the presence of a qualified interpreter is
critical and, thus, should be made mandatory. In fact, INS
Operations Instructions state that "Service personnel should secure
the assistance of qualified Service interpreters (including other
officers, full-time or contract interpreters), whenever they experi-
ence difficulties in conducting an interview of an alien who lacks
competency in English."
6 5
Even if the immigration inspector wishes to have an INS
interpreter on hand to communicate with the stowaway during the
short period of time the vessel is in port, the inspector may have
difficulty determining what language the stowaway speaks.
66
Moreover, simply arranging for an appropriate interpreter to meet
the stowaway at port can be difficult.
67
65 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE:
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, app.
2, § 01 103.2b(I) (1991) [hereinafter OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS]. Moreover, "[i]f the
alien appears to fail to comprehend questions, whether the interpreter has been
provided by the alien or Service officers, the interview should be rescheduled for a
later date." Memorandum from CORAP to Asylum Directors (Aug. 12, 1991),
reprinted in 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. V at 1217, 1218 (Sept. 16, 1991)
[hereinafter CORAP Memorandum].
It is noteworthy that the INS itself has recognized the importance of qualified
interpreters. However, INS Operations Instructions "do not have the force of law,
are furnished for the general guidance of service officers, and generally do not confer
substantive rights." CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 3.24[2] (rev. ed. 1991).
66 For example, many stowaways have been Ethiopian; because "[t]here are nearly
100 distinct languages, some of which have several dialects or less well-defined
regional variations" in Ethiopia, 17 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrTANNICA Eastern
Africa 820 (15th ed. 1990), it could be very difficult to discover quickly what language
the stowaway speaks. Cf. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE MIROSLAV MEDVID INCIDENT 10-19 (Comm.
Print 1987) [hereinafter MEDVID INCIDENT] (detailing the difficulty harbor police in
New Orleans had in determining the language spoken by a Ukrainian sailor who
jumped ship and the problem border-patrol agents faced when the INS supervisor of
interpreters in New York had no interpreters available). Although Medvid was a
crewman, not a stowaway, given the similarities in time constraints, language barriers,
and cursory questioning, his case is relevant in the stowaway asylum seeker context.
67 See MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66, at 14-15. The only Ukrainian interpreter
the border-patrol agents were able to secure at 12:00 a.m. was a woman in New York.
In regard to her telephone interview with the Ukrainian seaman, she stated: "It was
not a good connection and the speaker telephone was not working properly." Id.
Furthermore, the border-patrol agent "had some difficulty understanding [the
interpreter] because of her heavy accent and admitted that his southern drawl
probably gave her problems." Id. at 15; see also Political Asylum Procedures for Alien
Crewmen: Hearings on Political Asylum Proceduresfor Alien Crewmen and How They Were
Applied to a Soviet Seaman, Miroslav Medvid Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Refugee Policy of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1985) [hereinafter
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An attorney is a potential interpreter during shipboard inter-
views. 68 When an attorney is meeting the vessel and is willing and
able to interpret, she should be permitted to participate in the
shipboard screening.69  Recently implemented INS procedures
state that "attorneys are not to act as interpreters, if they are also
acting in the capacity of attorney, representative of the asylum appli-
cant."70 Although these guidelines prohibit the attorney of record
from serving the dual function of counsel and interpreter, the
attorney can interpret if "a waiver of the attorney for the interview"
is submitted.7 1 This policy suggests that the INS is not suspicious
of the participation of legally-informed interpreters in asylum
interviews; rather, the INS is probably most concerned with possible
ethical conflicts for the attorney.
Shipboard interviews with stowaways, however, are not asylum
interviews. They are only preliminary screening procedures through
which immigration officials determine whether the stowaway should
be disembarked to pursue an asylum claim. The concern for ethical
conflicts need not be as great for shipboard interviews. The
decision the immigration official makes after such an interview is
not as comprehensive as the one made after a full-fledged asylum
interview. The screening official is not adjudicating the stowaway's
asylum claim. On the other hand, for the stowaway, screening
interviews are vitally important; if the stowaway is not permitted to
disembark there will be no asylum interview. Since any attorney
serving as interpreter could do so under oath,7 2 when the attorney
PoliticalAsylum ProceduresforAlien Crewmen] (affidavit of Irene Padoch, the Ukrainian
interpreter) ("I had difficulty hearing the INS officer, who appeared to be on the
second phone. I had to repeat various questions and answers several times on
numerous occasions.").
6 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing how attorneys become
involved in stowaway cases).69 But cf Record, supra note 62, at 1-2 (stating that a second attorney, a native
speaker of Mandarin and a UNHCR appointee, was denied access during an interview
in which a Malaysian crewmember, who was not fluent in Mandarin, served as
interpreter. It was not until the next day that the INS granted the attorney
permission to interview the stowaway, even though the attorney was present when the
vessel arrived.).
70 CORAP Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1217.
71 See Attorneys May Not Interpret for Asylum Applicants, INS Says, 68 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1198, 1198 (Sept. 16, 1991) This means that the attorney interpreting could
not concurrently serve as the attorney of record. See id. The attorney could assume
primary responsibility for the case after the interview.
72 During asylum interviews the asylum officer must place the interpreter under
oath and complete a "Record of Interpreter's Oath in Asylum Interview." See CORAP
Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1219; cf 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c) (1991) ("The Asylum
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of record is the only qualified interpreter at a screening interview,
she should be permitted to interpret.
7
To avoid ethical problems that may arise when an attorney acts
as an interpreter, the best solution to the language barrier remains
a third-party INS interpreter. This is particularly true because "an
attorney should not have to wear two hats in order to ensure
statutory due process and fundamental fairness. Such a require-
ment would serve to disadvantage the alien whose attorney must
translate proceedings while at the same time zealously represent the
client."74 Additionally, attorneys cannot always be relied upon to
interpret because there is no reason "to believe that all members of
the class will be represented by counsel, or that those who are
represented will have attorneys who speak their language fluent-
ly."75 An attorney should be permitted to interpret as a last resort
when no INS interpreter is available. The INS should not rely on
pro bono counsel to be fluent in the relevant language or to bring
her own interpreter. It is ultimately the duty of the INS to ascertain
the stowaway's story in order to make an informed decision on the
asylum application.
76
In sum, the difficulties in securing an appropriate interpreter
for a shipboard interview suggest that all stowaways should be
Officer shall have the authority to administer oaths.... ."). A similar procedure could
be instituted for interpreters at shipboard screening interviews.
7- INS guidelines for interpreters at asylum interviews should be followed when
attorneys interpret. The INS instructions declare:
An asylum applicant shall be permitted to have an interpreter present
during the interview if a Service interpreter is unavailable, or the interview-
ing officer does not have a strong working knowledge of the foreign
language. The interpreter shall be placed under oath and directed to
translate the applicant's statements literally.
Memorandum from AndrewJ. Carmichael,Jr., Associate Commissioner Examinations
to All Regional Commissioners, District Directors and Officers-in-Charge, reprinted in
61 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. I at 522, 523 (June 29, 1984).
74 El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 727
F. Supp. 557, 563 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, No. 90-55292, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18089
(9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). Plaintiffs in El Rescate have filed "a petition for a rehearing
with suggestion for rehearing en banc." See District Court HadJurisdiction to Hear




76 Even when a qualified interpreter is available, the attorney could still monitor
the screening interview for accuracy. Under INS guidelines for asylum interviews, the
asylum officers must permit the "attorney of record to comment in a cooperative
manner and to further facilitate the process." CORAP Memorandum, supra note 65,
at 1219.
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mandatorily disembarked from their vessels so immigration officials
can avoid the time pressures of working under the ship's tight
schedule and can search for interpreters during regular working
hours. If procedures are not modified to allow immediate disem-
barkation of all stowaways, an INS interpreter should always be
aboard the vessel with the immigration inspector to help determine
whether a stowaway is making her fear of persecution known. The
reasoning that courts have used to require interpreters at exclusion
hearings before immigration judges is equally, if not more,
applicable in this context. One court recognized that if the plaintiff
understood English at the time, "he would have realized that his
asylum application did not state his true claim. This in turn might
well have induced him to place his complete claim on the record,
particularly if he had understood that this was ... his last opportu-
nity to substantiate his claim."77 Given the possible finality of the
shipboard encounter between an immigration official and a
stowaway, the presence of an interpreter during the shipboard
interview is just as important as during an exclusion hearing; if the
stowaway does not adequately convey her fear of persecution she
remains trapped on the vessel. The Second Circuit has recognized
that "[t]o erect barriers by requiring comprehension of English
[frustrates] the inclusive aim of the U.N. Protocol and the intent of
congress."78 The procedures of asylum law therefore must accord
with its purpose, since "errors stemming from lack of translation
may lead to the alien's return to persecution."
79
b. Due Process and the Right to an Interpreter
Due process requirements buttress the argument for mandating
the presence of an interpreter during a shipboard screening
interview. Traditionally, the Court has declared that "an alien
seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application."
8 0
There has, however, been movement away from this restrictive
doctrine. It is now accepted that while some protected interests
originate in the Bill of Rights, other "liberty or property interests
77 Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1984).
78 Id. at 37-38.
79 El Rescate, 727 F. Supp. at 562-63.
80 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); see also United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
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may have their source in positive rules of law creating a substantive
entitlement to a particular government benefit."8 1 In Yiu Sing
Chun v. Sava,8 2 the Second Circuit asserted that an asylum seeker
"may well enjoy some due process protection not available to an
alien claiming only admission."" The court found a liberty
interest in the right of non-refoulement, founded on the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol, and incorporated into domestic law
through the Refugee Act of 1980.84 It also suggested a possible
property interest "in the form of a right to petition for asylum."
8 5
8' Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)
("We think a person's liberty is equally protected even when the liberty itself is a
statutory creation of the State.").
82 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
'3 Id. at 877.
84 See id. at 877 n.25. Such an expanded analysis is plausible under the Supreme
Court's definition of liberty, which "[w]ithout doubt,... denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right... generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this reasoning
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), concluding that "[i]n a Constitution
for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad
indeed." Id. at 572.
8 Yiu Sing Chun, 708 F.2d at 877 n.25. The court noted several cases that
recognized the right to apply for asylum, including Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (finding a constitutionally protected
interest in the right to apply for asylum and the right to pro bono counsel), Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 380-81 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting a
preliminary injunction ordering INS to notify detained Salvadorans of their right to
apply for asylum and granting detainees a right to consult with counsel), and Nunez
v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584-87 (S.D. Tex.) (granting a preliminary injunction
ordering notice of asylum as a right to all Salvadorans and Guatemalans detained in
Los Fresnos, Texas), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). These cases did
not, however, exclusively define the right to petition for asylum as a property interest;
they also spoke of a liberty interest. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1039
("Whether this minimal entitlement be called a liberty or property interest, we think
it is sufficient to invoke the guarantee of due process."); see also Orantes-Hernandez
v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1507 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that "the right to apply
for political asylum... [does] constitute a substantial liberty interest"), aff'dsub nom.
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
Commentators have questioned the holdings of these cases. See, e.g., Martin,
supra note 46, at 220-21 (noting that "courts should recognize that fairness is possible
even in the absence of attorneys"); Note, Protecting Aliens from Persecution Without
Overloading the INS: Should Illegal Aliens Receive Notice of the Right to Apply for Asylum?,
69 VA. L. REV. 901, 929 (1983) (characterizing the "imposition of a notice require-
ment" as ajudicial "inability to construct a more flexible remedy for the problem of
coercion"). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties ':
A Response to Martin, 44 U. PrTt. L. REv. 237, 259 (1983) ("[Wihen the government
conduct becomes so outrageous, so obviously unfair, federaljudges will put a stop to
it. In attempting to do so, however, they will not be able to simply add another
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The Second Circuit later elaborated by stating that due process
protection may be especially important where a claim for withhold-
ing of deportation under § 243(h) is at issue.8
If stowaway asylum seekers warrant due process protection, it
should be determined which protections they are entitled to. In
making this determination, courts must weigh three factors: "the
interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as
the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards,
and the interest of the government in using the current procedures
rather than additional or different procedures."
87
Regarding stowaway asylum seekers, their private interest often
"implicates stakes that are off the charts-the highest possible."
88
At some point, however, the United States must be deemed to have
satisfied its statutory and treaty obligations to asylum seekers, even
if enhanced procedures produce an additional small amount of
useful information.8 9 Providing an interpreter, however, would
not merely yield minimal information; any meaningful communica-
flower in the garden of due process .... [They] are forced to leap in with both feet,
demanding costly and intrusive procedures ... ."). For further discussion regarding
the right to notice of the right to apply for asylum, see infra note 123. The
importance of the above cases rests, for the moment, in their recognition that aliens'
liberty and property interests are protected by the due process clause.
86 See Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37 (distinguishingJean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), aJd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), which declined to
find a constitutional interest in the right to be granted asylum under INA § 208).
The Augustin court maintained that the mandatory nature of INA § 243(h) warrants
greater due process protection of the right to asylum. See id. For an illuminating
analysis of these disparate holdings, see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 42, at 709-
10. Due process protection can be critical for a stowaway applying for asylum at the
district director level under § 208 because the applicant may not be entitled to a
§ 243(h) appeal to an immigration judge. See infra part IV.
87 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,34 (1982) (applying the three-prongbalancing
test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), for due process in an
immigration case involving an excludable alien).
88 Martin, supra note 46, at 190. In evaluating asylum procedures, Martin noted
that "[n]o other adjudication in our legal system potentially subjects the individual to
torture or summary execution." id; see also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 108 (9th Cir.
1969) ("It is particularly important that an applicant for relief under section 243(h)
have a reasonable opportunity to present his proofs, for the stakes are high.").
89 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ("[P]rocedural due process
rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied
to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."); see also Martin, supra note 46, at
223 ("[N]o procedural system, no matter how elaborate, is proof against error."). But
see Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 24850 (arguing that increased procedural protections
may be necessary to protect asylum applicants).
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don without an interpreter is hard to imagine. INS Operations
Instructions recognize that "[q]uality interpretation of interviews of
applicants for immigration benefits is essential for the proper
adjudications of their applications."90 The requirement that an
INS interpreter be present at the initial screening of a stowaway
would undoubtedly increase the accuracy of procedures.
Nonetheless, the "[g]overnment's interest in efficient administra-
tion of the immigration laws at the border also is weighty."
91
Immediate and definitive shipboard asylum determinations
engender efficiency. More elaborate screening procedures
requiring the presence of an interpreter also would impose a fiscal
burden on the INS. This burden could be decreased if all stow-
aways were disembarked and questioned through an interpreter at
a time convenient for all the parties involved.9 2 The policies of
automatic disembarkation and/or mandatory presence of an
interpreter also would presumably increase the attractiveness of
stowing away and thereby encourage aliens seeking entry into the
United States to bypass overseas screening procedures.9 3 This
development could generate an influx of marginal stowaway asylum
applicants, raising administrative costs and decreasing the effective-
ness of screening programs.
Yet because an interpreter serves as the linchpin in the initial
screening of an asylum applicant, the benefits of INS interpreter
services justify the added costs. An evaluation under the three part
due process test militates toward the mandatory presence of an
interpreter at all shipboard interviews, despite the admittedly
weighty government interest in efficient screening procedures. The
INS must make a good faith attempt to know the stowaway asylum
90 OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 65, 01 § 103.2b(1).
91 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.92 This would avoid the problem of trying desperately to contact an interpreter
before the ship departs. The Medvid incident is testimony to these difficulties. See
generally MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66.
93 Overseas refugee programs are the alternative to asylum for those seeking
acceptance by the United States. Beneficiaries of the overseas programs are selected
by U.S. personnel abroad. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 42, at 620-
38 (detailing the operation of U.S. overseas refugee programs).
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seeker's story to evaluate her situation intelligently; an interpreter
is indispensable for such an informed determination.
94
In conclusion, given the difficulty in securing an interpreter for
a shipboard screening interview, U.S. treaty obligations to refugees
and U.S. commitments under the Refugee Act can best be satisfied
by disembarking all stowaways for a fair asylum determination. But
if current procedures remain in place, the INS must supply an
interpreter during the screening interview on the vessel or at least
permit an attorney who is present and fluent in the relevant
language to interpret under oath.
2. The Pitfalls of Initial Screening by Immigration Officials
Aside from the logistical nightmare of arranging for an
interpreter to participate in a shipboard screening of a stowaway,
there remain grave complications with conducting shipboard
interviews, even if the INS does manage to bring an interpreter.
Before implementation of the new rule, commentators had long
urged the INS to reform its asylum procedures in light of "the
multiple translational, cultural, and psychological factors affecting
credibility determinations." 95 Under the new regulations, officials
must promptly remove a stowaway asylum seeker after she makes
her fear of persecution known. When an inspector, however, is
forced hastily to determine if a stowaway has articulated a fear of
persecution, two problems can arise to complicate the process:
official bias and asylum-seeker reticence. Because of these formida-
ble obstacles to a correct determination, the fate of stowaways
9' Langston Hughes offers good reasons for always supplying interpreters for
stowaway asylum seekers:
Refugee in America
There are words like Freedom
Sweet and wonderful to say.
On my heart-strings freedom sings
All day everyday.
There are words like Liberty
That almost make me cry.
If you had known what I knew
You would know why.
LANGSTON HUGHES, SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 290 (1959).
95 Neal P. Pfeiffer, Note, Credibility Findings in INS Asylum Adjudications: A
Realistic Assessment, 23 TEx, INT'L LJ. 139, 151 (1988).
1991] OBLIGATIONS TOWARD STOWAWAYASYLUM SEEKERS 307
should not be determined by the one official boarding the vessel; all
stowaways should be permitted to disembark to file an asylum claim
with the local district director.
a. The Problem of Official Bias
Under the new regulations, a stowaway must make her fear
"known to an immigration inspector or other official making an
examination on the conveyance."' Although not a full-fledged
asylum interview, determining whether a stowaway is articulating a
fear of persecution involves a critical credibility assessment. It is
rather disconcerting that the same rule that recognizes the demand-
ing and intricate nature of refugee determinations by establishing
a special corps of professional asylum officers, 97 allows for the
definitive screening of stowaways by immigration officials who may
have little or no experience with asylum cases. A stowaway's case
will be heard by an asylum officer only if the stowaway is removed
from the vessel and allowed to file an application for relief.
98
Although the immigration official first encountering the
stowaway on the vessel is to permit disembarkation if the stowaway
makes a fear of persecution known and is not supposed to make
credibility judgments, such subconscious assessments are almost
inevitable in the pressured situation of a shipboard interview. While
listening to a stowaway's story, the boarding INS officer may think
the stowaway is not being honest and decide, on the spot, to refuse
to allow her to disembark. There is a risk that decisionmakers may
engage in "snap judgments" and fail to "make adequate allowance
for cross-cultural difficulties."99 Even the presence of an interpret-
er cannot ensure that the credibility determination made by one
individual is accurate.
100
96 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(1) (1991).
97 See Robert Pear, U.S. Issues Asylum Rules Praised as Fairer to Aliens, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 19, 1990, at A16.
98 See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(2) (1991).
99 David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. 1EV. 1247, 1287 (1990); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at
250 ("Immigration officials ... have, at times, demonstrated disturbing degrees of
callousness and bias in evaluating asylum claims.").
"0Although the presence of an interpreter is indispensable to any accurate
asylum determinations, it complicates credibility assessments because "when an
applicant must rely on a translator, the [official's] perception of the applicant's
behavioral cues may be hampered." Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 146.
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Commentators have noted several "obstacles to an undistorted
interaction between asylum seeker and official. These include the
cultural relativity of notions and concepts [and] different percep-
tions of time"1° 1 as well as cross-cultural differences in behavioral
cues. 10 2 With respect to the first obstacle, one commentator
explains:
[t]he cultural relativity of words, notions and concepts, and, even
more importantly, the lack of consciousness of these differences
in perception, are major sources of misunderstandings in cross-
cultural communication. The problem certainly affects asylum
procedure: Too often officials assume that the way they think is
also the way the asylum-seeker thinks.'
03
Conceptions of family units,10 4 geography 0 5 and coun-
try10 6 vary among cultures.10 7  When an asylum seeker gives
answers that do not comport with an immigration official's notion
of these concepts, it may lead to a negative assessment of the asylum
seeker's credibility. Gross-cultural communication may be further
complicated by "the official's unintentional bias in interpreting the
statements in the light of his own legal concepts" 08 and political
101 Walter Kfilin, Troubled Communication: Cross Cultural Misunderstandings in the
Asylum Hearing, XX INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230, 231 (1986).
102 See Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 145-46.
103 K~in, supra note 101, at 234.
104 The concept of atomized, core family units is foreign to many cultures in
which extended family members or members of the same ethnic group are considered
an integral part of the family unit. See BETTY YORBURG, FAMILIES AND SOCIETIES:
SURVIVAL OR EXTINCTION? 124 (1983) ("Because of the importance of the mobility
factor, the nuclear family... predominates in hunting and gathering societies and
in postindustrial societies. In horticultural and agricultural societies, the family is less
mobile, or is immobile. It... strives to maintain the extended structure as the
cultural ideal.")
105 See Klin, supra note 101, at 234 (relating that a Turkish asylum seeker was
denied asylum partly because lie claimed to have hidden in the mountains
surrounding his hometown when the immigration official knew there were no
mountains in that area. Significantly, this Swiss official did not know that in Turkish,
"the term 'mountain' also applies to hilly regions.").
106 Borders in many parts of the world are artificially drawn and divide members
of the same ethnic group. See RICHARD SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF AFRICA'S
ECONOMIC STAGNATION 42 (1985) (describingAfrican countries as "artificial entities"
that were created by "European imperialists [who] paid no heed to cultural and
linguistic criteria in carving out national boundaries").
107 See generally Kflin, supra note 101, at 234.
108 Id. Commentators have noted, for example, the differences in procedure
among legal systems: "[In certain non-Western societies it is important to let persons
involved in legal procedures speak freely about issues which appear to be not directly
relevant to the topic of the procedure[,]" id. at 232, while in many Western countries
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views. Frequently, "[b]order patrol officers tend to regard persons
requesting asylum from nations friendly to the United States... as
illegal aliens attempting to gain time to establish a foothold in this
country."
109
Furthermore, the "culturally determined nature of self-image
and self-perception" may interfere with the asylum seeker's ability
to articulate an individualized fear of persecution.1 10 The expec-
tation that a true refugee will admit she was singled out for persecu-
tion is founded upon a Western conception of individualism and
self.111 Answering that conditions in her country do not affect
her freedom more than that of the average citizen may only be an
activist's "expression of a deep identification ... with the fate of
[her] suppressed people." 112 It does not necessarily mean that
she does not have a well-founded fear of individualized persecution.
Because the conceptualization of "common sense" varies among
cultures, it poses yet another obstacle in asylum interviews.
113
The notion of "common sense" is value-laden and molded by the
specific culture; as such, "the official's common sense is of limited
value for understanding many of the realities in the asylum-seeker's
country of origin."
1 14
Differing perceptions of time, another culturally relative
concept, can also obstruct a valid assessment of credibility. While
a general timeframe regarding a stowaway's experiences may be
necessary for understanding the asylum applicant's expression of
fear of persecution, an immigration officer might expect exactness
in dates and duration of experiences during a screening interview.
A newly arrived stowaway, however, may not be able to provide
detailed information immediately. Even if an asylum applicant does
recall the timing of events, there is no universal perception of time.
Each culture has its own measurement of time, which may be based
on a calendar system or centered around the timing of specific
events and activities.11 5  When pressed to give accurate dates
adjudicators expect applicants to discuss only issues relevant to the asylum claim, see
id. at 232-33.
109 Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 250; see also Martin, supra note 99, at 1274-75
(noting the political biases of INS officials and ofjudges).
110 See K6lin, supra note 101, at 235.
" See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOcAL KNOWLEDGE 59 (1983).
112 K,-lin, supra note 101, at 236.
113 See GEERTZ, supra note 111, at 75-76.
114 Kfilin, supra note 101, at 236.
11' The attorney for the stowaway Xiao Guangming emphasized that inconsistency
of dates in his asylum application should not have been part of the credibility
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corresponding to a Western calendar the asylum seeker faces a
dilemma: "Either he or she admits being unable to answer or tries
to meet the expectations of the official and guesses at dates which
might not be accurate. In both cases the applicant risks being
found lacking credibility."
1 16
The final obstacle to accurate cross-cultural communication is
the confusion triggered by different verbal behavioral cues among
cultures. Gaze patterns and the extent of eye contact, as well as
speaking rate, pauses in speech, and expression of emotion, vary
among cultures.1 1 7 If an asylum applicant's demeanor does not
comport with an official's conception of model behavior, the
applicant's credibility could be unjustly questioned.
Bias is, of course, not limited to border officials meeting vessels
at port; it is impossible for anyone, including district directors,
immigration judges, and even the newly trained asylum adjudicators
to be culturally neutral. When there are several layers of procedure,
however, the risk of faulty credibility assessments is at least reduced.
Because asylum cases require training in refugee credibility
screening, as well as in the conditions of various countries of origin,
"'[ilt seems unreasonable to expect immigration officers acting
alone to make such important and complex determinations.'"
1 8
Given that a subconscious assessment of the stowaway's
credibility is almost inevitable, the weighty decision on an asylum
claim cannot be left to the discretion of one official. It is "'a
fundamental premise of our jurisprudence that the decision of
weighty matters should almost never be placed in the power of a
single individual free from the control of a superior reviewing
body.'"
119
assessment. The life of Chinese peasants operates around seasons and the lunar
calendar. The attorney, who had spent extensive time in China, declared that more
consistent dates would actually be more suspicious in the application. See Taylor
Interview, supra note 62; see also Klin, supra note 101, at 236-37 (stating that "time
is not universally perceived, but members of different cultures have varying
conceptions of time and its relevance").
"1 Kflin, supra note 101, at 237.
117 See Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 145-46.
118 Steven G. Scheinfeld, Note, Due Process Rights of Asylum Applicants Expanded to
Include Stowaways: Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 751, 781 (1984)
(quoting COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1983, at 24 (1983));
see also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 1 192 (stating that immigration officers
should be required to refer asylum cases to a higher authority).
'19 Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1286, 1361 (1983) (quoting Hearings Before the President's Comm. on Immigration
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b. The Obstacle of Asylum Seeker Reticence
"[E]ven if we were confident that government officials were
obeying the letter and spirit of our asylum laws, we should still be
wary of friendly but informal procedures."1 20 It is possible that
a stowaway asylum seeker will not understand what is at issue when
an immigration inspector boards the vessel, particularly if there is
no qualified interpreter available. 121 Even if she does recognize
the gravity of the situation, a stowaway unacquainted with U.S.
immigration law will not realize that she must articulate a fear of
persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."122 Further-
and Naturalization, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1578 (1952) (prepared statement of Professors
Louis Jaffe and Henry Hart, Harvard Law School)). The Medvid incident provides
a useful illustration of this point. Even though the crewman Medvid had unhesitat-
ingly told the interpreter that he wanted to apply for asylum, the Border Patrol agent
felt no "need to contact any superior for advice in his Medvid decision since he
believed.., that Medvid was 'just another ship-jumper.'" MEDVID INCIDENT, supra
note 66, at 18. The INS officers believed that "Medvid simply feared returning to his
ship, but did not desire asylum." Id. Medvid was forcibly returned to his vessel,
despite INS regulations granting "immediate action" case status to Soviet asylum
seekers. See Medvid ex rel. Jeziersky v. New Orleans Police Dept., 621 F. Supp 503,
506 (E.D. La. 1985) ("INS violated its own 'immediate action' procedures by initially
summarily returning Mr. Medvid .... ).
120 Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 250.
121 See Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp 1270, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
("[Asylum] claims may involve factual issues that go beyond those which can be
decided fairly from short interviews with recently landed aliens, many of whom are
physically exhausted and unfamiliar with the language."), vacated and remanded, 566
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
122 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) (1991); see also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 1 46
("The expressions 'fear of persecution' or even 'persecution' are usually foreign to
a refugee's normal vocabulary. A refugee will indeed only rarely invoke 'fear of
persecution' in these terms ... ."). For example, when Medvid was asked why he had
jumped ship, he responded that "there were many reasons which could not be told
in a short time" but that he "wanted to live in an honest country." Political Asylum
ProceduresforAlien Crewmen, supra note 67, at 31; see also MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note
66, at 16-17; The Case of Miroslav Medvid: Hearing on H. Res. 314 Before the Comm. on
Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-
15 (1985) (testimony of Irene Padoch, INS interpreter) ("[T]here was no doubt that
Miroslav Medvid wanted to defect .... [H]e was so positive that he would like to stay,
he told me this is an honorable and honest country."); cf Young Stowaways Ask Asylum
from Ethiopia, supra note 44, at B2 (relating that after interviewing two stowaway boys,
INS officials stated that the boys "did not request asylum during the interview," even
though the stowaways later told the ship's engineer that they "feared for their lives
and wanted to escape").
A statement by UNHCR's Director of International Protection demonstrates that
Medvid's situation is not unique: "[T]he Convention saw the refugee as an individual
who had a well-founded fear of persecution. Today's refugee movements are
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more, even though the immigration inspector may ask a stowaway
if she wants to apply for asylum, the stowaway may not understand
the meaning of asylum.
123
somewhat different from what was envisaged in 1951. In particular,... the reasons
for leaving home are often complex, and are sometimes not simply the result of
persecution." Safeguarding the Right of Asylum, REFUGEES, Dec. 1990, at 6 (statement
of Michael Moussalli, UNHCR Director of International Protection); see also Martin,
supra note 99, at 1275 ("[M]ost of those applying [for asylum] in the United States
today were both drawn and driven, and they chose to come in response to a complex
mix of political and economic considerations.").
123 See MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66, at 16. The interpreter spoke directly with
the border patrol agent and "said that Medvid was not very sophisticated and.., did
not really understand the phrase 'political asylum.' She said that in his own words,
Medvid 'wants to live in an honest country,' but he does not know the magic formula,
or the exact phrase to use." Id. Apparently, "[tihe INS officer became impatient and
[told the interpreter] to ask whether [Medvid] wanted political asylum, because he
could keep him here only under those circumstances. [The interpreter] asked him
that and he unhesitatingly responded 'yes.'" Political Asylum Procedures for Alien
Crewmen, supra note 67, at 31.
The Medvid incident calls into question how effective notice of the right to apply
for asylum would be. INS has claimed that when aliens arrive at U.S. borders:
They are interviewed as to why they came here. If they have questions that
would flag asylum claims such as fear of persecution upon being returned,
they are identified. Those persons are told what their rights are; they are
given a form telling them what their rights are .... They are told that they
will be subject to an exclusion proceeding.... They will have the official
shot with the district director.
Caribbean Migration: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees,
and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 225-26
(1980) (statement of David Crosland, Acting Commissioner, INS). This procedure of
notifying only those aliens who allege persecution of their asylum rights mirrors the
procedure for stowaways under the new rule; if the stowaway makes a fear of
persecution known (and thereby flags an asylum claim) she is permitted off the vessel
and is given an opportunity to present her case to the district director.
There has been much debate over whether the INS should notify all aliens of the
right to apply for asylum. Several courts have granted this right to aliens from
specific countries. See supra note 85. But see Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937,
946-47 (5th Cir. 1984) (refusing to require that notice of the right to petition for
asylum be given to all aliens);Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) ("[N]either the Constitution nor the Refugee Act and its accompanying
regulations require the INS to inform all potential applicants of their right to seek
asylum."), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Medvid ex rel.Jeziersky v. New
Orleans Police Dept., 621 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D. La. 1985) (holding that no right to
notice of the right to apply for asylum exists). The INS has argued that blanket
notice would engender a flood of frivolous claims which would create a severe
administrative burden. One commentator has reasoned that "too many asylum
applications may only bury the truth by straining INS resources and preventing
careful assessment of individual claims." Note, supra note 85, at 924. On the other
hand, notice without the protection of counsel could have little impact on the number
of asylum seekers. See id. The latter effect is more probable in the stowaway context.
Given the relatively small number of stowaways, the INS would not be
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Even if a stowaway understands exactly what information the
immigration officer is asking for she may still be unable to convey
it during the limited time of a shipboard interview. Refugees cannot
be expected to make their fear of persecution spontaneously known
to an immigration official who boards their vessel. 124 Asylum
seekers have often had negative experiences with government
officials in their country of origin. Because "[n]othing in their past
experience prompts them to open up readily to strangers, particu-
larly when speaking of highly sensitive events," 125 stowaway
asylum seekers may be apprehensive when questioned by U.S.
immigration officials.12 6 For example, as
former members of political parties and groups which were illegal
in their home countries, [political refugees] have deeply internal-
ized the values of secrecy and suspicion toward outsiders; they
were part of a social network largely founded on these values
which were crucial for the success of the organization and the
freedom and even survival of its members.
2 7
overburdened if required to give stowaways notice. But notice of the right to apply
for asylum would do little good if the stowaway were not granted a formal hearing.
Like Medvid, a stowaway asylum seeker might not understand the concept of asylum
nor have an adequate opportunity to articulate her claim aboard the vessel.
Therefore, a thorough interview on land with a trained asylum adjudicator would be
a more valuable procedural safeguard than the right to notice of the right to apply
for asylum. During such a hearing, the burden would still be on the stowaway to
substantiate her story, but she would at least be given a fair chance to do so.
124 A case in point is In re Waldei, 19 I. & N. Dec. 189 (B.I.A. 1984), where the
stowaway arrived in New York on August 31, 1980 and then traveled to NewJersey
and Miami aboard the vessel. Finally, when the ship arrived in New Orleans on
September 11, 1980, "the applicant informed the immigration inspector who boarded
his ship that he intended to apply for asylum." Id. at 190. That eleven days passed
before the stowaway was able to convey his intent to an inspector raises the possibility
that only after several encounters with U.S. officials did the stowaway realize that he
must affirmatively request asylum; luckily, in his case, the vessel had not departed for
a foreign destination.
125 Martin, supra note 99, at 1286; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 250 ("No
matter how much goodwill the INS official displays, it is possible that bona fide
asylum applicants will be suspicious of government authority and unwilling to readily
disclose the factual basis of their claims.").
126 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 1146, 190, 198; AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL USA, REASONABLE FEAR: HuMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES REFUGEE
POLICY 30 (1990).
127 KMin, supra note 101, at 232. A further problem is that "[i]f, in the course of
the asylum hearing, [political refugees] perceive the interrogating official as not
sharing their own ideology and political views, they are likely to be reserved and
hesitant in the manner in which they express themselves and thus to present a
fragmented and confusing story." Id.
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Contact with officials is only one among many causes for
apprehension in the setting of a shipboard interview. Many asylum
seekers are victims of culture shock; they are amidst a "'bewildering,
confusing, depressing, anxiety-provoking, humiliating, embarrassing
and generally stressful' situation of persons who move from one
culture to another."
128
Unfortunately, there is a phenomenon of even greater concern
than confusion and anxiety among asylum seekers. The concern lies
in the "virtual epidemic among ... refugees of post-traumatic stress
disorder [(PTSD)]. 12 9  Immigration officials, not realizing that
"many PTSD sufferers experience a numbing of emotional respons-
es when remembering the [traumatic] event,"1 30 may be skeptical
when stowaway asylum seekers describe a grisly event "with little
visible emotion."1 3 1 An immigration official who is not aware of
this numbing reaction may find the case so incredible as not to
merit further consideration ashore-thus, condemning the stowaway
to her vessel. Ironically, such a traumatized stowaway is precisely
the sort of asylum seeker the United States most needs to protect
from refoulement.
If a stowaway asylum seeker does not find the act of conveying
her real story traumatizing, she may still be unable to convey a true
account. There are several reasons why refugees might deliberately
lie. They may alter their stories in "an attempt to meet the
presumed expectations of the official." 13 2 Secondly, a stowaway
128 Id. (quotingAdrian Furnham & Stephen Bochner, Social Difficulty in a Foreign
Culture: An Empirical Analysis of Culture Shock, in CULTURES IN CONTACT 161, 171
(Stephen Bochner ed., 1982)); see also Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 143 ("Because they
are attempting to assimilate themselves into a new and confusing culture, asylum
seekers may speak in an unconvincing manner."). The stressful setting can affect an
asylum seeker's "ability to articulate effectively, accent and voice quality." Id. at 145
(footnotes omitted).
129 Sandy Rovner, The Torture of the Refugee: WhyJudges Don't Believe, WASH. POST,
Sept. 2, 1986, Health section, at 10-11; see also Martin, supra note 99, at 1287 ("[P]ost-
traumatic stress disorder may... block consistent memory of past events."); Pfeiffer,
supra note 95, at 149 ("PTSD may be especially prevalent among refugees.").
130 Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 145; see also Neal R. Holtan, When Refugees Are
Victims of Torture, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1986 iN REviEW (U.S. Comm. for
Refugees) 24, 26 (1987) ("International agencies, governments, and individuals...
should not assume that refugees will spontaneously talk about torture or even admit
to having been victims.").
131 See Rovner, supra note 129, at 10-11 (recounting how even refugee relief
workers were perplexed at this phenomenon); see also Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 145
(asserting that some immigration officials expect the stowaway to be extremely
distraught when describing a traumatic event).
132 Kilin, supra note 101, at 237. Klin sets forth the example of Kurdish asylum
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asylum seeker is likely to have been denied asylum at various ports
before arrival in the United States. She may conclude that her true
story of persecution is not persuasive enough and alter her
history.13 3  Such unsubstantiated claims can result in a negative
assessment of credibility. Finally, because stowaway asylum seekers
may be confronted with a dilemma between "the 'subcultural' duty
to keep all activities of an illegal political group secret under all
circumstances and the requirement of the Asylum Act to disclose all
relevant facts," 13 4 they may view the concealment of their true
experiences as their only viable option.
The above obstacles impelling asylum seekers to hesitate before
divulging true accounts of their experiences are further compound-
ed by the cultural relativity of lie and truth. Anthropologists have
found that lying often has cultural justifications. For example,
"[1]ying is bound to be frequent in a culture much concerned with
the preservation of status ... and dignity."13 5 Such cultural
conceptions may be difficult for an immigration official to fathom,
and she may wrongly reject a potential asylum claim by "concluding
that a genuine refugee would never lie and, indeed, would have no
need to do so."
13 6
The many causes of asylum seeker reticence pose obstacles for
constructive interaction between officials and stowaways. These
obstacles highlight the need for asylum adjudicators who are
sensitive to the possibility of cross-cultural misunderstanding and
aware of diverse cultural perspectives. "It is important to avoid an
atmosphere of intimidation ... which makes the already confused
and anxious asylum-seeker even more nervous and unconvinc-
ing."
18 7
seekers who feared arrest because of their work for militant political parties in Turkey
but "claimed... that they were wanted for prohibited cultural activities." Id. Klin
concludes that the applicants probably believed that an asylum claim based on a fear
of punishment for cultural activities had a greater chance for success. Id.
l 5A particularlyvivid example of this phenomenon is that of a stowaway who was
originally denied asylum in Taiwan after candidly recounting the true story of his
activities in the People's Republic of China. Upon reaching the United States and
being interviewed by U.S. officials, he altered the focus of his account to concentrate
on his underground activities in Hong Kong, even though it was his activities in China
that actually conveyed a well-founded fear of persecution. See Taylor Interview, supra
note 62.
134 Kilin, supra note 101, at 237.
135 RICHARD F. GOMBRICH, PRECEPT AND PRACTICE: TRADITIONAL BUDDHISM IN
THE RURAL HIGHLANDS OF CEYLON 263 (1971).
136 Kin, supra note 101, at 238.
1
3
7 Id. at 239. llin further suggests that, in order to breach the gap between
316 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:285
These findings militate against the use of stowaway screening
interviews conducted by border officials on vessels to which the
bewildered and distraught stowaways have been confined for weeks;
such encounters epitomize an intimidating setting. Furthermore,
the officials involved at this early stage are unlikely to have
extensive training in asylum adjudication. If "[o]nly an indistinct
and difficult line separates those who should succeed on their
asylum applications from those who should not,"13 8 a stowaway
asylum seeker's fate should not hinge on one shipboard interview
as it does under the new rule. Inconsistency between an asylum
applicant's initial story and her application "may be found counter-
factual or insubstantial upon administrative or judicial review."
13 9
It is therefore crucial that all stowaways be immediately disem-
barked and permitted to apply for asylum before the local district
director.
3. Lessons from the Haitian Interdiction Program
On the whole, the entire shipboard stowaway screening program
envisioned through the new rule is ominously similar to the
screening procedures that were in place until March 1, 1991 for
asylum seekers under the United States-Haiti Interdiction Agree-
ment. 140 Under the Haitian interdiction program, the U.S. Coast
Guard intercepts unflagged Haitian vessels bound for the United
States and transfers their passengers to Coast Guard cutters. Prior
to the recent policy revisions, INS officials conducted short
varying legal procedures, interviewing techniques should allow "the asylum-seeker [to]
determine what he or she regards as relevant statements." Id.
138 Martin, supra note 99, at 1275.
139 Arthur C. Helton, Credibility Determinations in Asylum Cases, 4 FED. IMMIGR. L.
REP. 12, 13 (1986); see also Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding the BIA's reliance on inconsistency in asylum seeker's testimony misplaced);
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that, despite the
BIA's decision to the contrary, the asylum seeker's testimony did "not contradict her
asylum application statements").
140 See Exchange of Letters Between Ernest H. Preeg, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti,
and Edouard Francisque, Haitian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sept. 23,
1981, U.S.-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241; Executive Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180
(1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988). While the Haitian interdiction program
and shipboard interviews of stowaway asylum seekers differ in that the Haitians are
interdicted on the high seas and are not considered stowaways, they have sufficient
similarities (both involving cursory interviews and a strained setting) to allow for a
useful comparison. Documentation on the interdiction program contains insightful
information on shipboard screening procedures and poignantly describes the
problems of official bias and asylum seeker reticence.
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interviews with the passengers and if the interviewing officer was
satisfied that an asylum claim had merit, the Haitian could be
paroled into the United States for an exclusion hearing.
14 1
The INS insisted that "[i]t should be clearly understood that the
Service is not adjudicating asylum claims on the high seas but only
making a preliminary determination as to whether an interdicted
person may have a legitimate claim to political asylum that could be
pursued once in the U.S.." 142 Statistics, however, raise serious
questions about this assertion. During the decade of the interdic-
tion program, only six Haitians "have ever been found to have
expressed a sufficient fear of persecution to be brought to the
United States to pursue asylum";143 21,455 interdicted Haitians
were summarily returned to Haiti.144
In its study of the Haitian interdiction program, the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights found that the shipboard interviews
"may not be private; the Haitians may be hungry, are definitely ill-
at-ease and have no idea why they are being asked questions."
145
The shipboard interviews may also have been insufficient because
[m]any refugees will only relate what happened to them to
someone with whom they have established a relationship of trust
and confidence.... [O]nly indirect probing will reveal whether
the Haitian fears persecution in Haiti. Such indirect questioning
has proven essential in eliciting information from refugees who
... are unable to express opinions and beliefs for which they have
previously been made to suffer.
146
Chilling similarities exist between the old interdiction proce-
dures and those anticipated by the new rule for stowaway asylum
seekers. 147 Both sets of procedures require INS officials to oper-
14
1 
See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFouLEMENT: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HArTIAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT 20-
22 (1990) [hereinafter REFUGEE REFOULEMENT]. Although these interviews were
originally based on a questionnaire of 17 questions, a briefer 8 question version was
introduced due to time constraints. See id. at 21-22.
142 Haitian Interdiction Hearing, supra note 1, at 29 (testimony ofJames L. Buck,
Deputy Commissioner, INS).
143 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 141, at 64. Of the six that were brought
to the United States, "two had lived in the United States before... and three were
relatively well educated teachers able to articulate their claims." Id. at 23.
144 See id. at 24, 64.
145 Id. at 22.
I4 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
147 There are, of course, differences between stowaway asylum seekers and Haitian
asylum seekers. The Haitian interviewees have the advantage of being provided with
an INS interpreter. On the other hand, the Haitians face some obstacles that
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ate under severe time constraints and to make hasty determinations.
And the screening INS officer in either situation theoretically is not
to adjudicate the asylum claim aboard the vessel. The decade's
statistics on admission of Haitians into the United States therefore
bode ill for stowaway asylum seekers who are treated under the new
rule's procedures.
In light of criticisms of the Haitian interdiction program, the
INS adopted new procedures for the Alien Migrant Interdiction
Program (AMIO) which went into effect on March 1, 1991. The
interdiction procedures were "modified to include an opening
presentation by the INS officer and his interpreter explaining the
purpose of the ensuing interviews with INS."148 This affirmative
step was found "necessary to overcome the overwhelmingly negative
atmosphere resulting from the actual interdiction which immediate-
ly precedes the INS interviews. "149 The Director of Asylum also
issued a recommended twenty question interview question-
naire.
15 0
Under these new procedures, "[i]f the alien asserts or even hints
at past difficulties at home, or at a possible fear of returning home
... a more in-depth interview with the INS asylum pre-screening
officer must be conducted to determine the extent and reasons of
the fear and the credibility of the applicant."151 The asylum pre-
screening officer "should be fully aware of the political, cultural,
economic and social affairs of the interdicted alien's country of
origin" and "should also be well-versed in asylum law and prac-
tice."15 2 Interdicted aliens who express a "credible fear of return-
ing home should be routed to the United States to formally pursue
an asylum claim before an Asylum Officer." 153 The new proce-
stowaways might avoid. The Haitians venture to sea on tiny, overcrowded vessels,
only to confront U.S. authorities who are not necessarily sympathetic toward asylum
seekers from Haiti.
148 Gregg A. Beyer, Procedural Changes in the INS Asylum Pre-Screening Component
of the AMIO, Memorandum from Gregg A. Beyer, Director of Asylum, INS, to Leon
Jennings, Chief, Asylum Pre-Screening Unit, and Erich Cauller, Director, Miami
Asylum Office (Mar. 1, 1991), reprinted in 68 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs app. I at 804,804
(1991) [hereinafter Procedural Changes].
149 Id.
150 See id. at 806-07.
151 Id. at 804 (emphasis added). The Asylum Branch noted its awareness "of the
increased burden the ... changes will place on Service interpreters aboard the
cutters" and explained that it was considering "fundingadditional Unit interpreters."
Id.
152 Id. at 805.
153 Id.
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dures explain that "[tihis standard (for transfer to the United States)
is considerably less than the standard necessary to obtain asylum,
but considerably more than the so-called 'frivolous'/'manifestly
unfounded' threshold needed for employment authorization.
" 154
Unfortunately, the concerns addressed through the new policies
for the interdiction program still plague the procedures for
stowaway asylum seekers. The overwhelmingly negative atmosphere
that surrounds interdiction typifies the environment surrounding a
stowaway's first encounter with officials at the port of entry. It is
highly unlikely that a stowaway will receive an explanatory presenta-
tion by an INS officer or an interpreter before the screening
interview. Moreover, only if the stowaway asserts a fear of persecu-
tion will she be permitted to disembark; hinting at a possible fear
is not sufficient to trigger an in-depth shipboard interview with a
trained asylum officer and certified interpreter.
Lastly, while the interdiction procedures anticipate credibility
determinations during the screening interviews and define the
threshold for transfer to the United States as being considerably less
than the standard necessary to obtain asylum, the regulations for
stowaway asylum seekers do not even acknowledge that a credibility
assessment is inherent in the initial encounter between a stowaway
and an official. As a result, the stowaway procedures do not address
the problem of overly hasty determinations. In sum, because the
problems of the interdiction program echo concerns in the
stowaway context, comprehensive procedures, such as those recently
implemented for the interdiction program, should be promulgated
for the screening of stowaways at U.S. ports.
These comprehensive procedures should, for the reasons
previously discussed, include the mandatory disembarkation of all
stowaways. Given the problems of official bias and asylum seeker
reticence, the disparate levels of training in asylum adjudication
among officials boarding the vessels, and the lack of review of their
screening decisions, there exist grave risks that true refugee-
stowaways will not be let off their vessels and permitted to assert
fully their asylum claims, but instead will be sent back to persecu-
tion. Even before the enactment of the Immigration and Nationali-
ty Act in 1952, the Association of Immigration and Nationality
Lawyers had expressed concern about the summary exclusion of
154 Id.
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stowaways called for in INA § 212(a)(18). 155 While the new rule
marks clear progress from summary exclusion, the concern for
appropriate stowaway procedures remains.
4. The Presence of Counsel during Shipboard Interviews
a. Aliens and Access to Counsel
In any exclusion hearing before an immigration judge, an alien
has "the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel ... as he shall choose." 15 6 The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel granted to criminal defendants
has not been accorded to aliens in deportation proceedings; courts
maintain that these proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in
nature.1 57 Aliens can attempt to assert the right to appointed
counsel under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, but
this argument is likely to fail.1 58
Some courts, conceding that asylum seekers do not have the
right to appointed counsel, have nonetheless held that due process
mandates that the scheduling of exclusion hearings be tailored to
the availability of pro bono counsel.159 In light of these holdings,
commentators have noted that the current ban against appointed
counsel "provides only illusory cost savings," given the expenses the
155 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156 INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
157 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating that a
"deportation proceeding is a purely civil action"); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285
(1966) (same).
151 One court stated that an indigent alien might be entitled to government-
appointed counsel when "the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide
'fundamental fairness'" but found in the specific case that lack of counsel had not
breached such fundamental fairness. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568
(6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976). Some commentators have argued that, given asylum seekers'
precarious situations, all should have a right to appointed counsel. See Robert N.
Black, Note, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right To Assigned Counsel?, 8 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 289, 306 (1975); Elizabeth Glazer, Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel
in Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1185 (1985).
159 See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982) ("[W]e hold simply that the government violates the fundamental fairness which
is the essence of due process when it creates a right to petition and then makes the
exercise of that right utterly impossible."); Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) (enjoining exclusion proceedings against Haitian asylum applicants until
pro bono counsel became available), vacated, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also
Martin, supra note 46, at 220 (noting that these decisions have come "functionally
dose" to requiring appointed counsel).
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government incurs during prolonged detention of an asylum seeker
waiting for pro bono counsel to become available.
1 60
A question that arises is what rights aliens have during pre-
hearing interrogations. In the deportation context, if an alien is
arrested without a warrant 161 and brought in for questioning, she
need not be advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
162
until "[a]fter the examining officer has determined that formal
proceedings ... will be instituted .... 163 Courts have justified
this delay in issuing warnings by recalling that, in deportation
proceedings, the alien bears the burden of proof to establish that
she is entitled to remain in the United States. 164 Furthermore,
"the alien's silence may be used as the basis for drawing certain
adverse inferences." 16 5 Given these factors, courts have found
that the administering of Miranda warnings prior to preliminary
160 See Glazer, supra note 158, at 1184; Martin, supra note 99, at 1330; Martin,
supra note 46, at 220. One solution is that government-paid attorneys be made
available to asylum seekers, but because of budget constraints, this course is
"politically unlikely." See Martin, supra note 99, at 1329-30. The best solution
appears to be the crafting of an asylum adjudication system that is reliable, even
without the involvement of counsel. See id. at 1350-51.
161 By statute the INS has the power to undertake certain actions without a
warrant:
Any officer or employee of the Service ... shall have power without
warrant-(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
his right to be or to remain in the United States; (2) to arrest any alien who
in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States
in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating
the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, or to arrest any alien in the
United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the
United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest ....
INA § 287(a)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)-(2) (1988); see also supra note 22 (discussing
how INS arrests primarily focus on effecting removal rather than prosecution).
162 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that prior to any custodial interrogation, a
criminal defendant "must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney").
163 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1991). This regulation was instituted in 1979. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 4654 (1979). Between 1967 and 1979, INS regulations required that an alien
arrested without a warrant be immediately advised of her rights. See 32 Fed. Reg.
6260 (1967); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 42, at 432.
164 See United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavez-
Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975); see also INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361
(1988) (allocating burden of proof to the alien).
165 Chavez-Raya, 519 F.2d at 401; see also United States ex. rel Bilokumsky v. Tod,
263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (asserting that "there is no rule of law which prohibits
officers charged with the administration of the immigration law from drawing an
inference from the silence of one who is called upon to speak").
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interrogation, "would be not only inappropriate but could also serve
to mislead the alien."
166
b. Stowaways and Access to Counsel During Shipboard Interviews
The above analysis of aliens' rights serves as a useful backdrop
for an assessment of a stowaway's right to counsel during shipboard
interviews. Many attorneys involved in stowaway cases during the
early stages aboard the vessel are contacted by the UNHCR and
informed of the stowaway'A impending arrival at a nearby port. The
UNHCR asks the attorney to meet the vessel to ensure that the
stowaway has the opportunity to make an asylum claim, if such a
claim would be appropriate. Under the current procedures
applicable to stowaways, the UNHCR finds it necessary to secure
counsel for arriving stowaways because their disembarkation is not
ensured. If the procedures were changed to permit all stowaways
to disembark to assert their claims ashore, counsel would not be
required aboard the vessel, for there would be no shipboard
interview involved in the process. If the current procedures remain
in place, however, access to counsel aboard the vessel will remain of
paramount concern. Unfortunately, the pro bono attorneys
appointed by the UNHCR 167 are often dismayed when they go to
meet the ship (sometimes in the middle of the night) and are denied
access to the stowaway while the screening interview is conducted
by the INS.
1 6 8
166 Chavez-Raya, 519 F.2d at 402; see also Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366,
368 (9th Cir. 1975) (endorsing the reasoning in Chavez-Raya). Courts have noted that
the situation would be different if the statements had been coerced or if the
statements were used in a criminal proceeding for violation of immigration laws. See
Chavez-Raya, 519 F.2d at 400; Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d at 648; see also ALEINIKOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 42, at 433 (explaining that prior statements are sometimes
excluded on due process grounds "where [the courts or the BIA] conclude that the
circumstances surrounding the alien interrogation rendered the statements
'involuntary'").
167 The pro bono attorneys are generally immigration law practitioners in the port
city. Where a city's immigration bar is small and therefore unable to assist a
stowaway, the UNHCR has secured attorneys from quite far away. The author
experienced one such case during the summer of 1990, when two attorneys were
willing to drive four hours to Morehead City, North Carolina to assist two Ethiopian
stowaway children. The stowaways had previously been denied asylum in Philadelphia
and had jumped overboard twice.
168 See supra note 69 (relating incident in which access was denied to a UNHCR-
appointed attorney during an INS interview with a stowaway). In the case of the two
Ethiopian teenagers in Morehead City, seesupra note 167, an attorney who had served
in the Peace Corps in Ethiopia was effectively denied access to the stowaways when
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In the Medvid case,169 in which a Ukrainian sailor jumped into
the New Orleans harbor, pro bono counsel who had been denied
access to the interviews argued that their own constitutional rights
had been violated; they maintained that denial of access to their
client infringed on their First Amendment right of political
expression. 170 The court found that, while plaintiffs had a First
Amendment right to engage in such activity free from governmental
interference, they did not have "an affirmative right to the Govern-
ment's assistance in identifying and furnishing information to
political clients."
171
The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that denial of access
impeded their First Amendment right to associate. It reasoned that
because the closed interview has a "specific and important govern-
mental purpose," excluding "private citizens, so long as it is not
selective and based upon the content of their views, is not a
violation of the public forum doctrine." 172 This reasoning may be
based on the INS's desire to deter attorneys from chasing vessels.
In their attempt to obtain publicity, such attorneys might delay
asylum determinations.
This argument, however, is not viable in the stowaway context
because the attorneys seeking access to shipboard interviews do not
do so as private citizens. They are essentially UNHCR envoys,
17
and should "enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary
the Coast Guard demanded payment of $400 per hour for the attorney to access the
vessel which was anchored out at sea. See Telephone Interview with Kenneth Hatcher,
Immigration Attorney, Wilmington, North Carolina (July 5, 1990); see also Sannon v.
United States, 427 F. Supp 1270, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 1977) ("[I]nterviews were conducted
without counsel even though INS was well aware of the availability of counsel who
were ready, willing and able to be present at the interviews."), vacated without opinion,
566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
169 See MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66.
17 0 See Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1377 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
171 Id. at 1381. But seeJean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting
that "[tihe Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that counsel have a first
amendment right to inform individuals of their rights, at least when they do so as an
exercise of political speech without expectation of remuneration"), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
172 Ukrainian-American BarAss'n, 893 F.2d at 1381. The court further concluded
that "lawyers have no special first amendment status-that is independent of the
alien's right to counsel." Id. at 1382.
173 As UNHCR envoys, these attorneys must be distinguished from "religious
counselors, doctors, political activists, journalists, and a host of others [who] might
want to speak with a potential defector in order to offer their services or advice." Id.
at 1381-82.
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for the independent exercise of their functions." 174 Under the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 175 "[e]xperts performing missions for the United Nations
shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of
their missions." 176 As experts requested by the UNHCR to assist
an incoming stowaway, attorneys should be granted access to
shipboard interviews because their presence is "necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions."
Furthermore, as a party to the 1967 Protocol, the United States
has agreed to "undertake to co-operate with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... and ... in
particular [to] facilitate [the UNHCR's] duty of supervising the
application of the provision of the present Protocol." 177 Signifi-
cantly, the UNHCR Executive Committee, in describing basic
requirements of asylum procedures, has declared that "[a]pplicants
should.., be given the opportunity, of which they should be duly
informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR."178  This is
further reason for attorneys acting at the behest of the UNHCR to
be permitted access to shipboard interviews.
As a party to the Charter of the United Nations, the United
States has also pledged to take "action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55. " 179 These purposes include promoting "universal
respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms." 180 Those attorneys contacted by the UNHCR and present
at port are assisting the High Commissioner in promoting human
174 U.N. CHARTER art. 105, 12. The United States ratified the Charter on August
8, 1945, and it entered into force on October 24, 1945. See 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59
Stat. 1031 (1945).
175 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13,
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
176 Id. art. VI, § 22, 21 U.S.T. at 1434, 1 U.N.T.S. at 26.
177 1967 Protocol, supra note 26, art. II, para. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6226, 606 U.N.T.S.
at 270; see also G.A. Res. 428(V), Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissionerfor Refugees, ch. I, para. 1, 1950 U.N.Y.B. 585, 585, U.N. Sales No.
1951.1.24 [hereinafter UNHCR Statute] (stating that the UNHCR shall assume the
function of "seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting
Governments") .
178 Determination of Refugee Status, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 28th Sess., No. 8,
§ e(iv) (1977), in U.N. HCR EXECUTrVE COMM., CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 16, 17 (1988) [hereinafter Determination of Refugee Status].
179 U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
180 Id. art. 55(c).
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rights; the United States has an obligation to allow the attorneys to
attend screening interviews aboard vessels.
The UNHCR tries to distance itself from the asylum adjudication
once an attorney has been secured to meet the vessel. This reaction
is understandable given that the UNHOR must maintain neutrality
to retain credibility and that it plays only an advisory role in U.S.
asylum adjudication. In many stowaway cases, however, the INS
knows of UNHCR involvement because the UNHOR contacts the
INS main office in Washington to inform the INS that an attorney
has been secured to represent the stowaway. 181 The main office,
in turn, transmits the attorney's name to the INS office at the local
port of call where the stowaway is to arrive. Because of this
practice, UNHCR involvement is no secret. The UNHCR rarely
dedicates its scant resources to securing attorneys for asylum
seekers; when it does so for stowaways, it has already moved from its
distant advisory role. Given this unusual involvement, the attorneys
contacted by the High Commissioner are fulfilling the UNHCR
mandate and are acting as UNHCR envoys.
From the perspective of the stowaway's right to counsel, Miranda
warnings are not implicated because aliens are not entitled to be
advised of their rights during preliminary questioning.182 Even
if Miranda warnings were read to newly arrived stowaways, it is
highly doubtful they would have any effect. 8 ' Furthermore, if
counsel were willing and able to board the vessel, and the alien had
waived Miranda rights, the INS would not have to permit an
attorney to speak with her, unless she later asserted her right to
counsel. 18 4
181 See e.g., Record, supra note 62, at I ("I spoke with Scott Merry, of the shipping
agency Tricom, and told him that Ms. Peng and I would both work to represent the
stowaway. I understood from Scott Merry and the UNHOR that the Service was
informed of this.").
182 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
183 Seaman Medvid "was given a standard Miranda warning" but "did not take up
the offer of legal assistance." Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n, 893 F.2d at 1376. It is
difficult to imagine an exhausted alien, who probably knows little about our legal
system, asserting her rights to counsel in the intimidating context of a shipboard
screening interview.
184 See id. at 1382. In the criminal context, when a defendant voluntarily waives
her right to counsel, the police are not obligated to inform her that an attorney has
been retained on her behalf. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) ("[A]
rule that focuses on how the police treat an attorney-conduct that has no relevance
at all to the degree of compulsion experienced by the defendant during interroga-
tion-would ignore both Miranda's mission and its only source of legitimacy."). This
led the court in Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n to hold that
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This rationale for denying aliens access to counsel is not
necessarily applicable in the stowaway asylum seeker context. It is
improbable that counsel would encourage a stowaway to remain
silent, knowing that the burden of proof lies on the stowaway and
that if the stowaway does not assert a fear of persecution she will be
detained on the vessel. On the contrary, counsel's presence, with
the UNHCR's backing, could have the healthy effect of encouraging
a stowaway to divulge her story.18 5 One commentator has urged
that "[i]f reasonably available, ... counsel's role should be wel-
comed, primarily for the way in which prehearing consultation can
serve to sharpen the issues and especially to encourage reticent
applicants to tell the whole story."
186
Furthermore, it is likely that the denial of access to counsel
during a shipboard interview violates stowaways' due process
rights. 187 It is fundamentally unfair to deny stowaways access to
a UNHCR-designated representative during a screening interview,
which is typically the only forum where the right to apply for asylum
can be exercised.18 8  This is underscored by the fact that stow-
aways are a unique class of aliens with limited and unclear rights of
appeal who can be excluded solely on the basis of this preliminary
interview. For no other group of aliens does the preliminary
interview resound with such finality.
An application of the due process balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge189 leads to the conclusion that stowaways should be
[e]ven if Medvid had a right to counsel, the Government would not have to
permit a lawyer to speak with him unless he asserted that right .... It would
seem to follow that in the non-criminal context of an asylum interview, in
which the sixth amendment does not give the interviewee a right to counsel,
the Government is under no obligation to advise him that a volunteer could
be engaged for him.
Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n, 893 F.2d at 1382.
185 Psychologists have observed that the "preliminary interview for the hearing
may also be the beginning of healing if it is appropriately handled." Rovner, supra
note 129, at 11. An advocate's presence could be therapeutic, softening the starkness
of an encounter with INS officials.
186 Martin, supra note 99, at 1352.
187 Seesupra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (outlining how due process rights
are implicated in cases involving aliens).
188 See Glazer, supra note 158, at 1178 ("For an alien seeking asylum, ... the
absence of counsel makes meaningless his right to apply for relief."). While this
commentator argues that asylum seekers should have a right to appointed counsel,
her reasoning is particularly applicable to a stowaway's right to access to pro bono
counsel.
189 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews test is set forth supra notes 87-94 and
accompanying text.
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allowed to consult with an attorney during the screening stage. As
previously discussed, such a policy would serve both the weighty
private interest and the desire to increase adjudication accuracy.
The third prong of the Mathews test warrants discussion because
the government has some interest in maintaining its current policy.
Certainly, the presence of counsel could lengthen the screening
interview and, therefore, increase administrative and fiscal costs to
the government.1 9 0 However, although the presence of an attor-
ney might cause the INS to devote added attention to a stowaway's
case, such individualized attention is mandated by the Refugee Act
of 1980. Furthermore, since counsel is serving pro bono the
government would not be responsible for attorney's fees.
The presence of counsel might also detract from accuracy and
efficiency if, before the screening interview, the attorney told the
stowaway what information to convey to immigration officials or if
the attorney prompted her client during the interview. Given the
circumstances of a stowaway's arrival in the United States, however,
this possibility is remote. It is unlikely that the attorney would be
able to communicate with the stowaway so readily and understand
the gestures of the culture so thoroughly as to gain the confidence
of her overwhelmed client in the short time before the screening
interview. Given the utility of counsel during shipboard screening,
the weighty private interest at stake, and the limited government
interest to the contrary, stowaways should be permitted to commu-
nicate with attorneys at the screening stage.
In fact, this policy can be in the INS's interest; denial of a
stowaway's access to counsel can serve to lessen the agency's
credibility. The attorney may have to resort to calling the press or
filing a habeas petition. In the latter situation, denial of access to
counsel might engender judicial skepticism of the INS's position.
And there is always the possibility that if the stowaway is excluded,
the situation could explode into one similar to the Medvid incident
or, even more likely, a situation where a stowaway drowns after
jumping ship in an act of desperation. 19 1 Either scenario would
be a huge embarrassment to the INS. Damage control would then
impose a greater administrative and fiscal burden than simply
190 Cf. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 324-26
(1985) ('The regular introduction of lawyers into the proceedings would be quite
unlikely to further [the] goal [of simple and efficient proceedings].").
191 The desperate situation of the Ethiopian stowaway children in North Carolina
comes to mind. See supra notes 167-68; infra note 324.
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allowing the stowaway access to a pro bono attorney appointed by
the UNHGR. If it continues to use procedures that subject the
stowaway to a shipboard screening interview, the INS, should, if
only for its own credibility, accord attorneys secured by the UNHCR
immediate access to the stowaway.
III. UNHGR INVOLVEMENT IN U.S. STOWAWAY CASES
As described above, the UNHGR contacts many of the attorneys
who represent stowaways as they arrive. The UNHCR is first
informed about a stowaway's impending arrival either through its
branch offices in countries where the vessel previously stopped en
route to the United States 19 2 or by the ship's master or agent
and/or the attorney for the shipping line.
93
A. Duty to Report Presence of Stowaway Aboard Vessel
Immigration law in the United States requires the master or
commanding officer of a vessel to notify the INS of the presence of
a stowaway after such presence becomes known to the crew.
194
The law should also require that shipping lines notify the UNHCR
of any stowaway due to arrive at a U.S. port.195 Unfortunately,
192 Frequently, UNHCR personnel interview the stowaways at these foreign ports
of call. This happens most often in Japanese port cities, where Chinese stowaways
that boarded in Hong Kong arrive. Many of the stowaways that the author
encountered during the summer of 1990 had previously been interviewed by UNHCR
personnel at foreign ports.
195 The ship's master can telex or telefax the UNHCR information from aboard
the vessel. That attorneys for shipping lines have notified the UNHCR testifies to the
deep sympathy stowaway cases can evoke; these attorneys have told the UNHCR that
they wanted to ensure the stowaway was assisted with her asylum claim. See
Telephone Interviews with Shipping Line Attorneys (Summer 1990).
1 4 See INA § 231(d), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1221(d) (West Supp. 1991) (imposing a $300
fine for each person concerning whom an accurate manifest is not delivered by the
ship master to an immigration inspector); INA § 271(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a) (West
Supp. 1991) (imposing a duty on all masters, agents of vessels, and transportation
lines to prevent the landing of any alien at a U.S. port of entry unless a time and
place is designated by immigration officers and imposing a $3,000 dollar fine for any
violation); INA § 273(d), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1323(d) (West Supp. 1991) (imposing a $3,000
fine for failure to detain a stowaway until inspection and denying clearance to any
vessel that fails to pay this fine); see also Mason, supra note 15, at 364-66 (explaining
legal duties of vessel authorities).
195 Alternatively, the INS could notify the UNHCR of a stowaway's presence once
informed thereof by the shipping line. However, the INS probably would balk at
methodical UNHCR involvement in stowaway cases and would perceive the pro bono
attorneys contacted by the High Commissioner as "vessel chasers." It would be
simpler to have the shipping lines notify the UNHCR directly.
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the new asylum regulations evince regression on this matter; they
specifically eliminate mention of the UNHOR as a party to whom
information about asylum applicants may be given. 19 While such
information can be released at the Attorney General's discretion
after consultation with the Secretary of State, "it was felt that it is
inappropriate to specify a non-governmental agency to which the
Attorney General... may reveal information."
197
This specious categorization of the UNHCR as a nongovern-
mental organization contravenes the UNHOR Statute,1 9 8 through
which the General Assembly of the United Nations created the
office of the High Commissioner.'" The U.N. Charter specifical-
ly authorizes the General Assembly to "establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its func-
tions." 200 The UNHCR Statute further declares that the "High
Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the
General Assembly"201 and "shall report annually to the General
Assembly."
20 2
One commentator has concluded that
[c]learly, by derivation and intention, UNHCR does enjoy
international personality. As a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly, its 'personality' (its capacity to possess international
rights and duties) can be traced to the United Nations at large.
Moreover, its Statute shows that the Office was intended by the
General Assembly to act on the international plane.203
196 See New Reg., supra note 52, at 30,676 (analyzing 8 C.F.R. § 208.6) ("Applica-
tions shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the individual, unless under
the exceptions stated in this section .... Specific mention of the United Nations High




9 ' See UNHCR Statute, supra note 177.
199 See id. ch. 1, para. 1, 1950 U.N.Y.B. at 585 ("The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall
assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the
United Nations, to refugees.... ."); see also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 114
("Pursuant to a decision of the General Assembly, the [UNHCR] was established as
of 1 January 1951.").
200 U.N. CHARTER art. 22.
201 UNHCR Statute, supra note 177, ch. I, para. 3, 1950 U.N.Y.B. at 586.
202 Id. ch. II, para. 11, 1950 U.N.Y.B. at 587.
203 GuY S. GooDwIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1983)
(footnote omitted). Goodwin-Gill adds that the UNHCR's "standing in regard to
protection has been further reinforced by successive General Assembly resolutions
urging all states to support the High Commissioner's activities, for example, by
granting asylum, observing the principle of non-refoulement and acceding to the
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The UNHCR is therefore an intergovernmental, not a non-
governmental, organization. Under international law, "[t]he duty
not to return refugees to persecution or to a situation of danger to
life or limb is owed to the international community of states, as
represented by the UNHCR."204 The new rule's treatment of the
UNHCR as a non-governmental organization contradicts the
organization's status under international law.
Because the UNHCR represents the international community of
states, it would be entirely appropriate to require vessels bound for
the United States to notify the UNHCR of a stowaway's presence.
Commentators have urged that it is "incumbent... to make good
our intention to comply with international standards by conforming
the administration of our refugee law with the advice of
UNHCR."205 Despite its expertise and impartiality, the UNHCR
has only been asked to assist the INS on an ad hoc basis, most
notably in reviewing all Haitian asylum cases in the late 1970s.
20 6
UNHCR access sharply declined during the 1980s when the Reagan
Administration balked at UNHCR involvement in asylum proce-
dures; one official declared that these determinations are "a
fundamental attribute to sovereignty."20 7 Despite this trend, the
INS should "welcome UNHOR participation" because it "could
improve its own credibility as a fair and unbiased agency" by
cooperating with the High Commissioner.20 8 Again, as in the
access to counsel situation, notification of the UNHCR is of
paramount importance if the INS continues to deny stowaways
automatic disembarkation. If INS procedures were amended to
relevant international treaties." Id.
204 Id. at 122.
205 Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
Histoiy of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 78 (1981); see also Note,
supra note 85, at 928 ("[P]erhaps we can no longer afford to leave the UNHCR out
of our search for solutions to an international problem.").
206 See Anker & Posner, supra note 205, at 77; Martin, supra note 99, at 1319.
207 Martin, supra note 99, at 1320 n.192 (quoting W. Scott Burke, Compassion
Versus Self-Interest: Who Should Be Given Asylum in the United States?, 8 FLETcHER
FORUM 311, 325 (1984)).
208 Note, supra note 85, at 929. Several other countries permit UNHCR
representatives to participate directly in asylum proceedings, among them Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, and Italy. See Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum
Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 243, 263-64
(1984) (detailing the involvement of the UNHCR in the asylum processes of
numerous countries); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 42, at 708 ("The
agency's independence could be further demonstrated by following Germany's
example of permitting the UNHCR to have a permanent observer at the agency.").
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allow all stowaways to disembark so that they could pursue their
claims ashore, the UNHCR would not have to be as involved as it
currently is in stowaway cases.
Because the United States is obligated to facilitate the UNHCR's
duty of supervision 2 °9 and asylum seekers have the right to con-
tact the UNHCR, 2 10 vessels bound for U.S. ports should be
required to contact the UNHCR about a stowaway's presence.
Otherwise the High Commissioner has no way of knowing of a
stowaway asylum seeker's impending arrival in the United States.
This notification should not be left to the Attorney General's
discretion as it currently is under 8 G.F.R. § 208.6,211 for the
Executive Branch has generally been hesitant to involve the UNHCR
in its operations. This skepticism is only magnified in the realm of
stowaways, a class of aliens traditionally considered highly undesir-
able.
While the INS probably would oppose the notification require-
ment by asserting that it does not want UNHCR-appointed attorneys
chasing vessels at port, this requirement should be implemented in
light of the tenuous rights presently accorded stowaways. If the
UNHCR is not involved or an attorney is unable to meet the vessel,
a stowaway may be deported after an inadequate screening
interview, or worse, she may jump overboard in desperation.
A further reason why the notification requirement should be
imposed is that, while most shipmasters and crews befriend
stowaways and go out of their way to assist them with their
claims, 212 there have been many incidents where stowaways have
209 See 1967 Protocol, supra note 26, art. II, para. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6226.
21 0 See Determination of Refugee Status, supra note 178, at 17 ("Applicants should...
be given the opportunity, of which they should be duly informed, to contact a
representative of UNHCR.").
211 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (1991).
212 See e.g., Rebekah Denn, Chinese Stowaways Hope for New Life, SEATrLE TIMES,
July 27, 1991, at All (describing incident in which shipping company paid over
$18,000 in custody costs for two stowaways and declared that "it would attempt to do
the most humanitarian thing possible, to ensure that they got a fair chance at
asylum");JohnJohnson, Vietnamese Stowaways Reach a Happy Landing, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
24, 1989, at B4 (relating incident in which a Greek captain became "almost a father"
to four stowaways who spent four months on his vessel while they were denied asylum
in Singapore, India, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan); cf. Ken Ross, INS Grants
Refuge to Vietnamese Stowaway, UPI, Oct. 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (recounting incident in which a Vietnamese stowaway lashed himself just
above an oil tanker's propeller prompting the captain of the vessel to declare: "I am
not happy with any stowaway on board but.., this kind of man, who would make
this decision, is a man I can only respect"); YoungStowawaysAsk Asylum From Ethiopia,
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been thrown overboard, tortured, and/or mistreated.2 13 The
United States has a duty to assist the UNHCR in monitoring the
safety of such stowaways.
21"1
B. UNHCR Release of Documents to Attorneys
Attorneys working with stowaways have expressed frustration
with the UNHCR because it requires a release to be signed by the
stowaway before any documents about the case can be released to
the attorney. These documents may include telexes of interviews
conducted with the stowaway by UNHCR personnel at other ports
of call as well documents found on the stowaway and faxed to the
UNHGR by the ship's master or agent, or obtained by UNHOR
personnel at other ports of call. Obviously, the stowaway's signed
release can only be secured once the attorney meets with the
stowaway. Thus, before the attorney can fax the release to the
supra note 44, at B2 (relating incident in which a nautical engineer mobilized refugee
organizations to assist the stowaway children because he was distressed by their plight
and by the treatment they had received from other crewmembers).213 See e.g., Captain Gets 10 Years in Stowaways Trial, J. COM., Sept. 16, 1985, at
24B (noting conviction of Greek freighter captain who "dump[ed] 11 African
stowaways into shark-infested waters;" he testified that he thought they would survive
because "in [his] experience sharks don't eat blacks"); Colombia Told Two Stowaways
Were Thrown Overboard, REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, Dec. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library (relating incident in which crewmember of Panamanian-flagged vessel
bound for United States informed authorities that "two Colombians were tortured
and then thrown into the sea near Cuba last November 26 after being discovered
aboard the ship"); Five Illegal Haitians Found Caged, Shackled on Freighter, REUTERS,
July 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter CagedHaitians] (detailing
incident in which several Haitian stowaways were shackled to the deck with handcuffs
and "[t]hree of the men were locked inside a four-foot cage on the ship"); Israeli
Captain Is Suspended After Ship Put Stowaway Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1984, at A15
(noting suspension of captain accused of forcing a Kenyan stowaway offhis ship into
a makeshift raft off the East African coast); Portugal Releases Asylum-SeekingStowaways
from Ship Container, REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, Apr. 20, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library ("The captain was reported to have locked [three stowaways] in a contain-
er .... They said they had food and water but suffered appalling conditions inside the
box, where they spent four days. Two were taken to a Lisbon hotel while the third
man was taken to [the] hospital with a hernia."); Rough Ride, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 17,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("One Ghanaian stowaway and three others
died [in rough seas] after being set adrift at sea [in a life raft] by a Turkish vessel
.... "); Young Stowaways Ask Asylum from Ethiopia, supra note 44, at B2 (relating that
two stowaway boys were "handcuffed and kept in a spare-parts room" and, at one
port, were even put in leg chains).
214 See infra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (discussing the international duty
to notify the UNHCR of the presence of stowaways aboard a vessel). The notification
requirement should not be solely an obligation under U.S. law; other countries should
require notification of the UNHCR under international law.
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UNHOR's offices it is possible that the vessel will have left port with
the stowaway or an asylum record already will have been established
while the attorney was operating without necessary information.
While it is understandable that the UNHOR wishes to protect the
stowaway's privacy,2 15 it is also the UNHCR's duty to protect
asylum seekers from refoulement.216 If the UNHCR expects attor-
neys to represent stowaways pro bono, it should not complicate
their task-which is difficult enough given obstacles created by U.S.
immigration law.
Furthermore,.documents found on the stowaway are no longer
private; most likely the ship's crew, master, and agent will have read
them, and the INS routinely receives the documents from the ship's
master. Because the attorneys are acting at the behest of the High
Commissioner, there should be no obstacle to providing them with
transcripts of UNHOR interviews. These interviews can provide
useful background information to an attorney before she reaches
the stowaway's vessel. Moreover, there is little risk that an attorney
Would attempt to sabotage her client's case by leaking damaging
information about the stowaway.
Before the UNHOR sends documents about the stowaway to the
attorney, it could get a signed statement from the attorney stating
that such documents are being released by the UNHCR, as an agent
for the asylum seeker, with the understanding that their use will be
governed by the Rules of Professional Responsibility. This method
is preferable because all concerned parties operate on a more
flexible timetable before the vessel arrives in port; after it arrives
the attorney must focus on gaining access to the stowaway.
Even if the UNHCR is unwilling to disclose documents before
receiving the stowaway's signed release, the UNHCR personnel
dealing with the attorney before the stowaway arrives must make
clear from the outset that their office has documents available and
that a release will be needed to access them. This way, once the
attorney is able to meet the stowaway, she can immediately have the
release signed.2 17 Presently, the attorney is often not informed
215 See, e.g., L.A. Chung, Chinese Dissenter Who Hid 9 Months Gets U.S. Asylum, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 29, 1990, at A6 (describing a 26-year old stowaway who identified
himself to the press "only as 'Mr. Zhang' to protect his family and sympathizers who
helped him" during the pro-democracy movement in China).
216 See UNHCR Statute, supra note 177, ch. 1, para. 1, 1950 U.N.Y.B. at 585;
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 1[ 13-19.
217 The UNHCR should have available to the attorney a standard release form
translated into the most common languages of stowaways, such as Mandarin.
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of the need for a release until after she has met the stowaway. By
this time, the stowaway may be in detention or may still be on the
vessel, making it extremely difficult for the attorney to arrange an
interview time that is convenient for her, the INS, and the interpret-
er.
218
Given these complications, the UNHGR should seriously
consider releasing documents to the attorney before she goes to
meet the vessel. Through this procedure, if the INS denies access
to the attorney and the stowaway remains detained on the vessel,
the attorney will at least have some information to include in the
habeas petition. In addition, if the attorney must file a quick
appeal, or if her client is already in detention, she will have
additional information to submit on the client's behalf.2 19 This
immediate release of information may also avoid direct UNHCR
involvement, in the form of last-minute intervention, when the
stowaway is about to be excluded. At that point, the INS is less
likely to reverse a decision and a faulty record may already have
been established.
In sum, shipping companies should be required by law to notify
the UNHCR of stowaways. In addition, the UNHCR, when
expecting attorneys to provide pro bono assistance to stowaway
asylum seekers, should provide those attorneys with all available
218 See, e.g., Record, supra note 62, at 4 ("Xiao has been in detention, and
therefore unable to assist us easily. Every timeI need to meet with him, I depend on
an interpreter who is volunteering his or her time, and it is difficult for us to
coordinate our schedules.").
219 The experience of one attorney is particularly illustrative:
[O]n the morning of August 6, 1990 I telephoned Ms. Zey to say that I
needed more time to obtain documents which would support Xiao's claim,
and could not adequately rebut the intent to deny at the meeting scheduled
for that day. Ms. Zey [the asylum officer] responded that the meeting would
take place whether or not I was present. In order to protect my client's
interests I attended the meeting.... I had no additional documents to
submit.
Id. at 3. If the UNHCR does not release the documents in its possession and still
expects the attorney to represent the stowaway by filing a habeas petition or an
appeal, it may be putting the attorney in a precarious position as she may be subject
to Rule 11 sanctions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("The signature of an attorney ...
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law ... ."). If the attorney cannot speak to the stowaway and does not
receive any documents from the UNHCR, she will have little evidence to substantiate
her petition.
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relevant documents because these documents are critical for
carrying out the UNHCR mandate of protecting refugees.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REv EW
The new rules require that those stowaways who are disem-
barked after making their fear of persecution known to an immigra-
tion inspector or other official must be granted ten days to file for
relief with the district director.2 20 The district director is to
forward these applications immediately to an asylum officer. A
decision denying asylum to a stowaway "may be appealed directly to
the Board of Immigration Appeals" within ten days of the asylum
officer's decision.
221
Unlike other asylum applicants who have the right to appeal to
an immigration judge under INA § 235(b), stowaway asylum seekers
disembarked under the new rules are denied this intermediate stage
of appeal. 222 A disembarked stowaway is, of course, better off
than one who never even makes it off the vessel. But the denial of
the right to appeal to an immigration judge and, thus, the denial of
the right to an exclusion hearing, translates into unequal treatment
of asylum seekers.
Aside from the initial asylum determination conducted by an
asylum officer,2 23 the quasi-judicial hearing before the immigra-
tion judge is the only stage at which a live record is created.
224
220 See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(2) (1991).
221 Id. § 253.1(f)(4).
222 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (describing this right of appeal);
supra notes 34-36 (explaining the three levels of review generally available to asylum
applicants); see also Asylum Application Mail-in Program to Asylum Offices Issuances
of Charging Documents in Exclusion and Deportation Proceedings by Supervisory
Asylum Officers, 56 Fed. Reg. 50810, 50810 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Asylum Reg.]
("If an asylum officer denies the asylum claim, the alien may in most cases renew the
claim before an immigration judge after the issuance of deportation or exclusion
proceedings."). Notably, under the Haitian interdiction program, aliens brought to
the United States and found ineligible for asylum after an initial interview can pursue
their claims de novo before an immigrationjudge. See Procedural Changes, supra note
148, at 805.
223 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(a) (1991).
224 See Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 143. Commentators have raised the concern that
"two rounds of de novo consideration" delay final determinations in a system where
"[s]peed is a concern, a vital concern .... Without speedy denials, the system will
either attract large numbers of marginal claimants or else force resort to other costly
and troublesome deterrents which indiscriminately burden genuine refugees."
Martin, supra note 99, at 1324. Furthermore, two proceedings may be unnecessary
given the current involvement of specially trained asylum officers at the initial
interview stage. See Telephone Interview with David Martin, Henry L. & Grace
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During an exclusion hearing, an asylum seeker must be "examined
under oath on his application and may present evidence and
witnesses on his own behalf."225 The alien must also be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to "examine and object to evidence against
him, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Govern-
ment."226 The BIA, on the other hand, "never hears live testimo-
ny from the applicant himself."227 Thus, the immigration judge's
credibility findings and the record created through the testimony
are critical to a comprehensive and accurate review by the BIA.
Ironically, those stowaways who manage to get off their vessels,
either through a habeas petition or by swimming ashore, and who
would initially be in a worse position because they were forced to
remain on their vessel after an inability to articulate a fear of
persecution to an immigration inspector, would be accorded greater
rights of appeal. Those who swim ashore would be automatically
put into deportation rather than exclusion proceedings228 and
would then have the right to appeal to the BIA. 229 Stowaways
who depart their ships through habeas petitions would have the
right to appeal their asylum decision to an immigration judge, at
least in jurisdictions that accorded that right to stowaways prior to
the promulgation of the new rules.
230
Doherty Professor of Law, University of Virginia (Sept. 23, 1991) (telephone interview
notes on" file with author). While such procedures remain in place, however, they
should be applied consistently to all asylum seekers.
25 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(c)(3) (1991).
226 Id. § 236.2(a).
227 Pfeiffer, supra note 95, at 142. While Pfeiffer's essay deals with the BIA's
review of immigration judge findings, it is equally applicable to the BIA's direct
review of credibility determinations made at the district director level. In the
analogous context of labor dispute adjudication, one court concluded that "[o]ne
must attribute significant weight to an ALJ's findings based on demeanor because
neither the [regulatory] Board nor the reviewing court has the opportunity similarly
to observe the testifying witnesses." Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir.
1982).
228 See In re A-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 356, 361 (B.I.A. 1961) ("[W]here an alien has
effected an entry into the United States ... he is properly the subject of expulsion
proceedings."). Expulsion proceedings are synonymous with deportation proceedings
and must be distinguished from exclusion proceedings. See supra note 7. Aliens in
deportation proceedings have greater rights than those in exclusion proceedings.
Compare INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988) (describing deportation proceedings) with
INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) (describing exclusion proceedings).
229 See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(d) (1991).
230 These jurisdictions include the Second Circuit, see Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983), and those courts that endorsed the Yiu Sing Chun holding,
see Guo-Jun Cheng v. Ilchert, 698 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fang-Sui Yau v.
Gustafson, 623 F. Supp. 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1985); see also supra notes 40-44 and
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This disparate treatment goes directly against the mandate of
the Refugee Act of 1980, which instructs the Attorney General to
"establish a procedure for an alien... at a land border or port of
entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum ... ."231
Not only does the new rule's limited appeal process distinguish
stowaway asylum seekers from all other asylum applicants, but it
also creates a sub-class of stowaway asylum seekers who are denied
the interim appeal stage-other stowaways may be entitled to the
appeal by staying outside of the new rules.
Thus, the new rule, promulgated to help ensure that stowaway
rights conform with U.S. obligations under the Refugee Act of
1980,232 actually denies to those stowaways who are able to articu-
late a fear of persecution and are disembarked under the new rules,
an important right of appeal they previously held in several jurisdic-
tions. 23 3 Therefore, to comply with the Refugee Act's mandate
of equal treatment for all asylum applicants, the rules should be
amended to give all stowaway asylum seekers the right to an
exclusion hearing before an immigration judge. Given the risk of
faulty asylum determinations, asylum seekers should be accorded
"effective procedural rights.., including the right to a comprehen-
sive review of asylum-decisions; any curtailment of such rights
potentially diminishes the chances that asylum seekers can correct
cross-cultural misunderstandings which have already occurred."
23 4
accompanying text (discussing whether courts and the BIA have granted stowaways
the right to appeal to an immigrationjudge). The California district court decisions
are significant in that many stowaways arrive at the California ports of Oakland and
Long Beach. The law in these jurisdictions presumably remains unchanged by the
new rules, since the rules only apply to stowaways who disembark after they assert a
fear of persecution to an immigration inspector or other official aboard the vessel.
231 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Moreover, in the
House Conference Report on the Refugee Act, the House and Senate Committee of
Conference declared that"[t]he Conferees direct the Attorney General to establish a
new uniform asylum procedure under the provisions of this legislation." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 161.
252 See New Reg., supra note 52, at 30,679.
233 Admittedly, this rule was a welcome change in that it provided enhanced
procedures for some stowaway asylum seekers.
234 KSIin, supra note 101, at 239.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Given the problems of securing interpreters for shipboard
interviews, the high likelihood of bias and rash credibilityjudgments
on the part of immigration inspectors or other officials untrained
in asylum adjudication, and the obstacles of asylum seeker reticence,
all stowaways should be immediately disembarked upon arrival.
235
235 Several stowaway cases under the new rule attest to the necessity of immediate
disembarkation of all stowaways. When five Haitian stowaways arrived on a freighter
at the port of Miami, two "jumped into the ocean about a mile from Miami Beach"
and were returned to the ship by the INS. Treatment Protested, NEWSDAY, July 12,
1991, News Section, at 16. After the stowaways were returned to the vessel, "[tihe
captain said he was ordered by immigration officials to take the men back to Haiti
and was told he faced fines of up to $15,000 if they escaped so he put them in chains
and caged some of them." Appeals Court Temporarily Stays Deportation ofFourHaitians,
UPI, July 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; see also Caged Haitians, supra
note 213 (statement of Duke Austin, INS spokesman) ("The crew said it was too hot
to hold the Haitians below deck and had no other way to maintain custody of the
men .... They were subject to fines if the men escaped."). Only after the
happenstance "sight[ing] of the Haitians chained and caged on the ship triggered
protests by Haitian exiles and brought the Haitian Refugee Center to the aid of the
men" did the INS finally permit the stowaways ashore to assert their asylum claims.
Appeals Court Temporarily Stays Deportation of Four Haitians, supra.
Without mandatory disembarkation, the fate of stowaways largely is determined
by whether concerned individuals or agencies can intervene to prevent a stowaway's
automatic exclusion and/or mistreatment. A remarkable example is the exemplary
treatment of two Chinese stowaways who arrived in Seattle onJune 30, 1991. In
marked contrast to the debacle of the five Haitian stowaways who arrived several days
later in Miami, these two stowaways were disembarked immediately, housed in a
motel by the shipping agent, and later released on bond. See Chinese Freed, supra note
62; Chinese Stowaways Reportedly to Seek Political Asylum in U.S., AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE,July 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. This hospitable treatment
was not surprising given that "the brother of one of the [Chinese stowaways] had
contacted a U.S. news agency in Hong Kong to say the women were on their way to
the United States." Id. Furthermore, an attorney from Seattle's Federation for a
Democratic China and a college instructor-interpreter, who met the vessel as it
arrived in port, said they too had been contacted by the brother. See Chinese Pro-
Democracy Leaders Ask U.S. Asylum, UPI, July 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library.
The outcome of Xiao Guangining's case is yet another example of how critical
outside assistance remains under the current rule. Through persistent advocacy, his
attorney finally convinced the BIA that "the procedure before was so flawed that the
fairest thing is to begin anew." Stowaway Gets Hearing, supra note 62. As a result,
Xiao Guangming "was freed just 16 days after his first [asylum] hearing." Chinese
Refugee Is Finally Granted Political Asylum Here-INS Hearing Clears Protester, SEATrLE
TIMES,July 26, 1991, at D4. Had the UNHCR not secured counsel on his behalf, he
would not have been granted this critical rehearing.
Under the new rule, stowaways without outside aid will continue to be forced to
jump overboard. See, e.g., One Stowaway Drowns, Two Missing, UPI, May 28, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("Four stowaways sought freedom byjumping from
the deck of a Panamanian freighter into the Houston Ship Channel ... but one of
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An alternative procedure for improved accuracy in asylum determi-
nations would be shipboard screening interviews with interpreters,
specially trained asylum officers, and any available attorneys present.
The presence of these individuals is essential to any meaningful
shipboard screening of potential asylum seekers.
The latter procedure would, however, be neither the most
efficient nor accurate procedure and, consequently, would be
difficult to implement. For example, locating INS interpreters who
can work around a vessel's tight schedule can be a logistical
nightmare. 23 6 In addition, although the local supervisory asylum
officer or her staff could meet the vessel and conduct an initial
screening, sending the officer to meet one individual would be
inefficient-these trips would interfere with the officer's responsibili-
ties at her office. 23 7 Notably, a similar system was in place until
the men drowned, one was rescued and two were missing."). One UNHCR official
recounted a similar incident where an Albanian stowaway, whose vessel arrived in
Newark, NewJersey during February 1991, was denied disembarkation even though
he had asserted a fear of persecution to the screening officer. In an act of
desperation, and with the assistance of a sympathetic captain, the stowaway asylum
seeker managed to escape from the vessel and swim ashore. This incident is an eerie
echo of the fate of other stowaways in Newark. See Truck Kills Stowawayfrom Ship,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1987, at B4 ("Nine stowaways on a cargo vessel from Ecuador
fled the ship yesterday in Port Newark, and minutes later a truck hit two, fatally
injuring one and seriously hurting another. .. ")
236 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
27 The specially trained supervisory asylum officers, whose positions were created
under theJuly 1990 rule, seesupra text accompanying note 56, have begun to staff the
seven new asylum adjudication sites, which opened on April 1, 1991. See INS Asylum
Supervisors Named, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1450, 1450 (1990). These offices are
expected to become "the major sites for asylum adjudications under the new
regulations. In addition, asylum officers from those sites will periodically 'circuit ride'
to locations more than ... 300 miles away." Id.; see also INS Opens Asylum Offices Amid
Large Backlogs, Charges of Inadequate Funding, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 401, 403
(1991). It would often be difficult for these asylum officers to arrive on short notice
from their offices to interview a stowaway at the harbor.
Significantly, a new INS interim rule, which went into effect on October 9,1991,
(with provision for post-promulgation public comments that were due November 8,
1991), explains that "ij]urisdictions of [the asylum offices] have been developed to
make effective use of full-time asylum officers .... " 1991 Asylum Reg., supra note
222, at 50810. Under this interim rule, asylum officers will periodically visit "ports
of entry in order to interview asylum applicants." Id. The rule mandates that asylum
interviews at ports of entry "be conducted after the applicant has had time to
properly prepare his/her case." Id. As such, the INS concedes that accurate asylum
adjudication hinges on affording asylum seekers sufficient time to prepare their case.
Stowaway asylum seekers who undergo screening interviews are denied this critical
time for preparation.
Additionally, under theJuly 1990 rule, if a stowaway is disembarked after making
a fear of persecution known, the district director must "immediately forward any such
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the 1951 Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated it precisely
because it was deemed a nuisance for officials to board the incoming
vessels.
238
While such shipboard hearings might alleviate the bias and
interpreter problems, they would still be problematic because the
asylum officer would be interviewing an exhausted stowaway who
may have been on the vessel for weeks, if not months. Moreover,
this screening would be subject to time constraints imposed by the
vessel's departure schedule. The pressures that led to the fiasco in
the Medvid case could easily surface in such a situation.
23 9
Since these problems would exist under any shipboard interview
process, the UNHOR would probably continue to find it necessary
to locate pro bono counsel willing to meet the vessels. But under
the current procedures (or any proposed reforms) pro bono
attorneys alone cannot be relied on to monitor asylum determina-
tions because they would soon be overwhelmed. 240 The proce-
dures must ensure "a full and fair opportunity to present an asylum
claim [to all applicants], even if the individual is unrepresent-
ed." 241 This opportunity can be realized only if the proceedings
are conducted after the stowaway has been disembarked. Stowaways
application to an Asylum Officer with jurisdiction over his district." 8 C.F.R.
§ 253.1(f)(2) (1991). Given that the Department of Justice has recognized the
importance of specially trained officers in asylum adjudication and that stowaway
asylum seekers are effectively denied access to such officers because it is difficult for
them to meet the vessels, stowaways should be let off their vessels so they can have
an opportunity to apply for relief with the district director.
2s See S. REP. No. 1515, supra note 10, at 366-67 (emphasis added). In New York,
the INS had boards of special inquiry (immigration judges) hold "hearings aboard
vessels upon which the stowaways arrive[d]." Id. at 366. The Chief of the Entry and
Departure Section of the INS's New York office testified that "the system of holding
hearings on board incoming vessels had caused the office much concern and had
been a nuisance." Id. at 367.
239 See MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66.
240 See Martin, supra note 99, at 1328 (noting that "the limited numbers of pro
bono attorneys are easily swamped" when asylum claims increase numerically);
Martin, supra note 46, at 220 ("[V]olunteer help cannot always be counted on,
especially if a sudden rise in the number of asylum seekers overwhelms recruitment
efforts."); Black, supra note 158, at 299, n.72 ("It seems doubtful that volunteer
counsel could consistently handle the case-load."). Any viable proposals for changes
in asylum determination procedures must "enable speedy but fair decisions in a
heavily burdened system, without being entirely dependent upon the availability of
pro bono efforts from the private bar." Martin, supra note 99, at 1352.
241 Martin, supra note 99, at 1329; see also Martin, supra note 46, at 221 (noting
that solutions for improved asylum procedures "must rest on an adjudication system
that can operate fairly even if the applicant appears without counsel").
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then would not be such a priority protection concern and attorneys
would not have to be secured.
242
If the Justice Department does not amend the current proce-
dures governing the treatment of stowaways and it is not feasible to
require an asylum officer to meet each stowaway aboard the vessel,
then, at a bare minimum, the INS must grant the stowaway access
to an INS interpreter during the shipboard screening interview. In
addition, if the UNHCR has secured an attorney for the stowaway,
that attorney must be granted access to her client aboard the vessel
at the same time immigration officials gain access. Lastly, carriers
should be required to give the UNHGR notice of the presence of a
stowaway aboard. These procedures would be a step in the right
direction even if they do not fully satisfy U.S. duties under the 1967
Protocol and the Refugee Act of 1980.
Under the new rules, stowaway asylum seekers which have been
disembarked "may be detained by the Service," 243 or "paroled
242 Stowaways could then be treated like other asylum seekers. One useful side-
effect of automatic disembarkation of stowaways would be that the UNHCR could
reallocate some of the scarce resources it currently expends on locating pro bono
counsel for stowaways. The UNHCR's intervention in stowaway asylum seeker cases
is uncommon-the High Commissioner usually will only send asylum seekers lists of
local attorneys and non-governmental organizations to contact. The only capacity in
which the UNHCR typically assists asylum seekers directly is by writing advisory
opinions in particularly compelling cases, and then only if the request is made by an
attorney and the applicant is seeking withholding of deportation in a hearing before
an immigration judge under INA § 243(h). Due to limited resources, the UNHCR
does not intervene when the case is still before the asylum officer. Aside from these
roles, the UNHCR Legal Counsellor's office devotes significant time to drafting
UNHCR amicus briefs for pivotal refugee law cases and to lobbying for systemic
changes in immigration policy, both in the domestic and international arenas.
243 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(3) (1991). Under 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d), the INS must assume
custody of any alien subject to detention. This change from "carrier responsibility to
INS responsibility for the custody and detention of excludable aliens" was effected in
Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 100 (1989) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d)). INS Publishes
Final Rule on Custody and Detention of Excludable Aliens, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 68,
68 (1989).
This rule was triggered by egregious cases such as Medina v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d
800 (5th Cir. 1988) and Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987). In
Medina, the court found that the INS had no duty to inspect and designate an
appropriate detention facility for stowaways. One of the guards at the private facility
in which ten stowaways were placed "used his shock gun as a 'prod,' which
accidentally discharged, killing [one stowaway] and wounding [another]." Medina, 838
F.2d at 801. In Lynch, 16 stowaways alleged that they "were shackled and forced to
perform labor on behalf of the Harbor Police... under threat that refusal to work
would result in withholding of food." Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1367. The stowaways
described that
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into the custody of the ship's agent or otherwise paroled." 44 Last
year, the INS instituted a pilot program to parole detained asylum
seekers to see "whether it makes sense to release asylum seekers
who arrive without valid travel documents."245 Two hundred
asylum seekers (including some stowaways) have been released in
Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York City under this
new program. 246 The INS should continue utilizing this pro-
[t]hey were required to take showers in unheated water and, when some
refused because the cold water was making them ill, were hosed down with
a fire hose that slammed them against the iron walls of their cells and left
their clothes, blankets, and cell so wet that they could not go to sleep.
Id. On this score, the Fifth Circuit held that because "[m]ost of the stowaways who
were sprayed allege[d] no serious injuries as a result of the incident" their allegations
did not "form a sufficient basis for recovery." Id. at 1376.
Additionally, the Harbor Police allegedly had "drugged their coffee" and then
"locked them in A steel shipping container," which had been "lashed to the deck"
because the barge "had no facilities for human occupancy." Id. at 1367. The
stowaways maintained that "the container was in danger of being swept off the barge
by heavy surf." Id. at 1367-68. Responding to these allegations, the Fifth Circuit
declared that "the stowaways possessed no due process right to remain free of
incarceration" and that "[e]ven the steel container provided much more humane
accommodations than the bare steel barges on which they originally hid." Id. at 1376.
For further discussion of this case, see infra note 324.
244 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(0(3) (1991). Parole is a status under which an alien is
permitted to come into the United States but is not officially cleared for entry. See
INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988) (indicating that "parole of such
alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien"). A paroled alien remains
subject to all of the grounds for exclusion. Deportation proceedings generally apply
only when one has effected entry, even if such entry was illegal.
Traditionally, the INS paroled aliens who could not meet immigration require-
ments but whose entry was in the public interest. These included refugees prior to
the establishment of a set procedure for their admission under the Refugee Act of
1980. Parole is still used in cases involving sick aliens or aliens who do not have time
to get a visa, such as those who wish to visit a dying relative. See GIL LOESCHER &
JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS 55-56, 74, 124, 154 (1986); NORMAN L.
ZUCKER & NAOMI F. ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE: THE REALITY OF AMERICAN
REFUGEE POLICY 31-32 (1987).
245 iNS Pilot Program to Release 'Excludable'Asylum Seekers on Parole, REFUGEE REP.
(U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), May 18, 1990, at 12. The asylum
seekers must show the district director that "they have an attorney, employment, or
other means of support" and that their claims, "if proven true, would make them
eligible for refugee status." Id. "[T]hose released on parole [are] required to report
each month to the local INS office and to appear at all hearings before immigration
judges." Id.
See Laurie Goodstein, First Stop in America forAsylum Seekers: Jail; INS Considers
Expanding Parole Program, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at A3. Several of the
stowaways, whose cases the author became acquainted with during the summer of
1990, were released under the parole program in San Francisco, Seattle, and Los
Angeles.
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gram247 by releasing stowaways into the custody of non-govern-
mental organizations.
248
Stowaways who are not released under the pilot program would
have to be detained by the INS. This would not impose a significant
financial burden on the INS because, under the INA, the vessel
owners must bear these costs.249 Therefore, the INS primarily
247 In a report assessing the implementation of the pilot parole program, the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights recommended that "the pilot parole project
should be terminated as a demonstration project and replaced with a new general INS
policy for releasing excludable aliens." Pilot Program Releases Detained Asylum Seekers,
REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 28, 1991, at 10, 11
[hereinafter Pilot Program]. The expansion of the parole program would avoid the
unfortunate detention situation, which has arisen since the INS reinstated this policy
in 1981; aliens had not been detained since the dosing of Ellis Island in 1954. As a
result of the detention policy, "those who forthrightly present themselves to
immigration inspectors and are not found admissible... can be... condemned to
indefinite detention, while those who have the foresight to evade inspection, the mere
liars and sneaks ... are able to gain entry and are in a superior legal position."
Haitian Interdiction Hearing, supra note 1, at 146 (statement ofArthur C. Helton, Esq.,
Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
Significantly, the new guidelines for the Haitian interdiction program state that
"[a]ny aliens brought to the United States should be paroled in the 'public interest'
into the care of an appropriate voluntary agency." Procedural Changes, supra note 148,
at 805. Under these procedures, the "voluntary agency would be responsible for care
and maintenance and for arranging appropriate legal assistance" for the asylum
seeker. Id.
248 Many sympathetic non-governmental organizations have been willing to assist
stowaways. These organizations have been helpful in securing pro bono counsel, as
well as in finding shelter and employment for the stowaways. See generally Denn,
supra note 212, at All ("Members of the Chinese community have offered [the two
stowaways] housing and some chances at employment... while they wait for the INS
to review their case . .. ."); Future Still Uncertain for a Cuban Stowaway, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 27, 1982, at B12 ("Clara Nufiez, a 20-year-old Cuban stowaway whose efforts to
seek refuge in the United States became a rallying point for Miami's Hispanics [sic]
community, is struggling to adjust to American life one year after her arrival.");
Johnson, supra note 212, at B4 (relating that after four Vietnamese stowaways left
their vessel, they "were met at the Port of Long Beach by members of the Vietnam-
ese-American community from the city of Orange");John McAleenan, Kids Again: 5
Stowaways Risked All to Flee War, Find Childhood, CFH. TRiB., July 13, 1988, § 5, at 1-2
(describing how a refugee resettlement expert with the Lutheran Social Services
found a foster mother and immigration lawyer for five stowaway Ethiopian children).
Notably, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has emphasized "the importance
of active involvement by voluntary agencies for the success of the [pilot parole]
program." See Pilot Program, supra note 247, at 11.
49 See INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (1988) ("The cost of the mainte-
nance including detention expenses and expenses incident to detention of any
[exrludable] alien while he is being detained shall be borne by the owner or owners
of the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived ... ."). Admittedly, the INS would have
to bear the cost in those cases where it is not successful in collecting the fee from the
owner.
344 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:285
would incur only the administrative cost of affording these detained
stowaways hearings before the district director, the immigration
judge, and the BIA.
Adding the intermediate level of an appeal to an immigration
judge would, of course, lengthen the duration of detention;
stowaway cases would no longer be adjudicated under the accelerat-
ed timetable of the new rules. 250  One would hope that, as the
new asylum procedures urge, "[w]here possible, expedited consider-
ation shall be given to applications of aliens detained under 8 CFR.
part 235. " 251 The prospect of a stowaway asylum seeker being
forced to languish in detention while awaiting a hearing is disheart-
ening, but it is better than having her spend months, if not years,
stuck on a vessel as a "refugee in orbit"252 or being forcibly
returned to persecution in the country of origin.
The suggested procedures for stowaway asylum seekers would
ensure greater protection for stowaway refugees. Of course, "no
procedural system, no matter how elaborate, is proof against
error."253 But while the stowaway asylum seeker ultimately bears
the burden of coming forth with her history and with evidence, the
system must offer an adequate and reasonable opportunity for the
stowaway to make her claim. 254 The ship's deck, with an immigra-
tion inspector or some other official, is simply not an adequate
forum.
The United States has agreed through the 1967 Protocol, the
Torture Convention, and the Refugee Act of 1980 to protect
refugees from refoulement.2 55 Adequate protection for stowaway
asylum seekers requires the right to a full hearing before a trained
asylum officer, the right to all levels of appeal, the right to a
250 Under the new rules, a stowaway has only ten days within which she can appeal
the asylum officer's decision to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4) (1991).
251 8 C.F.R. § 208.5(b) (1991). Section 235.3(b) states, in part, that "[a]ny alien
who appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and who arrives without
documents ... shall be detained." 8 G.F.R. § 235.3(b) (1991).
252 A "refugee in orbit" is one who travels from country to country because no
country is willing to grant her permanent asylum.
253 Martin, supra note 46, at 223; see also id. ("[P]erspective is needed ... [as]
asylum policy can provide, at best, only a small portion of the answer to these [human
rights] abuses."); Martin, supra note 99, at 1352 ("The system cannot be designed for
the chance (although it is admittedly real) that in a small percentage of the cases such
delay and coaxing will unearth a meritorious case.").
254 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, 1 196 ("[W]hile the burden of
proof.., rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant
facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner.").
255 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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qualified interpreter, and the right to UNHCR assistance. The
United States cannot, in good faith, urge "Hong Kong not to deport
Vietnamese asylum seekers or entreat Thailand to grant full access
to UNHCR" if it ignores international law at its own borders by
utilizing procedures that threaten stowaways with erroneous and
avoidable refoulement.
256
Stowaways were categorized as excludable aliens in reaction to
the fear of an INS overburdened with stowaways arriving at U.S.
shores in the first half of the twentieth century. 257 The stringent
treatment accorded stowaways under INA § 212(a)(18) and § 273(d)
is, however, an anachronistic policy that was instituted when it was
thought necessary to deter a large influx of vessel stowaways.
258
256 See Arthur C. Helton, Open Letter to AmbassadorJewel S. Lafontan United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., 2
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 130, 132 (1990).
2JRecall that from 1921 to 1950, 13,755 stowaways were excluded at U.S.
borders. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 5, at 111.
218 It is impossible to ascertain how many stowaways are arriving at U.S. shores.
Some manage to stay in the United States through vigorous intervention by the
UNHCR, non-governmental organizations, and the pro bono bar, or by swimming
ashore and sneaking into the United States. Others, who die aboard their vessels or
drown, are only reported in news accounts, or go unnoticed altogether. Throughout
history it has been impossible to determine the number of stowaways that arrive at
U.S. shores. SeeJarvis, supra note 4, at 48 n.115; see aloJoint Hearings, supra note 10,
at 166 (transcribing statement of Alfred U. Krebs, Counsel, National Federation of
American Shipping, Inc., upon being asked "how many stowaways would you say get
in, or try to get in?": "Frankly, I don't have that information.").
Between May andJuly 1990, UNHCR secured counsel for at least 15 stowaways.
This figure represents a significant increase in stowaway numbers over previous years,
though it only represents stowaways about which the High Commissioner was
informed. The number of stowaways will probably continue to increase. Many
stowaways arriving at U.S. ports have been Chinese persons fleeing from hiding in
Hong Kong. The situation in Hong Kong could deteriorate rapidly as 1997
approaches. These worsening conditions could heighten desperation and trigger
stowing. See generally Activists in HongKongAssist 4 Chinese Dissidents to Escape, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1989, at A18 (reporting that an "underground railroad" is helping
student leaders and intellectuals escape China's crackdown on supporters of the pro-
democracy movement); Barbara Basler, Colony's Cold ShoulderforDemocracy's Goddess,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1989, at A4 ("Hong Kong, which is to be handed back to China
in 1997, is now quick to censor itself, and equally quick to criticize any word or deed
that could upset or offend China."); Fox Butterfield, Beijing Protesters Said to Flee to
a Now-Uneasy HongKong, N.Y. TIMES,June 30,1989, at Al (noting that the crackdown
in Beijing and the flight of protesters is "spreading concern among residents that
Hong Kong should avoid doing anything to offend China"); Stephen Schwartz, Chinese
Democracy Supporter in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 1989, at A29 ("[T]he Beijing
government is pressuring Hong Kong leaders to curb the movement that supports
Chinese dissidents .... ").
Unsurprisingly, countries have begun to encounter stowaways from the world's
most recent trouble spots. See, e.g., Iraqi Stowaways Seek Asylum in Argentina, REUTERS,
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Presently, control over U.S. land borders and airports is the greatest
concern for the INS. 259 Although it is true that "stowing away is
as old as shipping, . .. in our modern times it is almost as old as
flying."260 An uncontrollable influx of vessel stowaways is highly
unlikely.
Admittedly, expanded procedures for stowaways could encour-
age marginal asylum applicants to stow away in an effort to bypass
overseas screening procedures. Such an increase in the number of
stowaways arriving by vessel could in turn trigger compassion
fatigue and a sense of loss of control over our borders. 261 Public
July 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (relating incident involving Kurdish
stowaways); Liberian Stowaway Escapes Ship, INDEPENDENT, June 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library (relating incident in which one Liberian stowaway escaped
custody and "five more refugees from the Liberian civil war were on two other vessels
waiting to dock"); Seven Kurds From Iraq Granted Asylum in South Africa, REUTERS, Feb.
10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("[T]he [Kurdish] men arrived [in South
Africa] as stowaways.., to escape the looming war.").
However, even if all of these stowaways were accounted for, they would not
number more than several hundred per year. It is not their numbers that makes the
situation of the stowaways compelling, but rather their precarious situation under
U.S. immigration law.
259 The immense increase in arrivals by plane has led to the coining of the term
"jet people" for this group of asylum seekers. One commentator has noted that
"[t]he latest class of refugees does not travel as refugees used to do, on foot, by rail,
or by boat. It travels by intercontinental jet." SMYSER, .supra note 6, at 92.
26°Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 205 (statement ofJoseph Mayper, Chairman
and Counsel, Trans-Atlantic Passenger Conference). The quote begins: "Any of you
who have read sea stories for generations back know that stowing away is as old as
shipping...." Id. at 205. Such a romanticized vision of stowing away is prevalent
in our culture. Not only is it common in literature, see e.g., Richard Eder, A Sprawling
Picaresque Novel, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at E14 (reviewing LESLIE EPSTEIN, PINTO
AND SONS (1990)) (summarizing that Pinto "stows away aboard a Europe-bound ship,
only to find it is headed for the California Gold Rush"), but stowing away is also
portrayed rosily in movies, see e.g., Marcia Froelke Coburn, Reunited: The Long and
Bumpy Road to Love, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1991, Tempo Section, at 6 (recommending
Warren Beatty's REDS (Paramount 1981), duringwhich Louise Bryant "stows away on
a freighter and treks across a vast frozen tundra" in search of her lover,John Reed);
Christopher Cornell, The Marx Brothers at the Movies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1990, Friday
Section, at 56 (suggesting that the movie MONKEY BUSINESS (MCA/Universal 1931),
"maybe the best film for introducing a neophyte to the Marxes, with the four crazies
playing stowaways aboard a luxury ocean liner chock-full of pompous characters");
Henry Sheehan, Film Review: 'Shipwrecked, BPI, Feb. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library (describing the film SHIPWRECKED (Walt Disney Pictures 1991), as
"intelligent family entertainment" in which a "feisty girl.., stows away on the ship
... and finally [helps] to vanquish the buccaneers"); see alsojarvis, supra note 4, at 26-
27 n.6 (listing a television series and several movies depicting stowaways).
One commentator has written that "the law of the sea and coast is fascinating.
Like the sea and coast themselves, it is irresistibly seductive. The figurative potential
alone has a powerful pull." MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER 35 (1985). This
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fascination makes it difficult to imagine that one would be stowing away to avoid
persecution or that stowing away aboard a vessel not designed for passengers could
be life-threatening. The truth, however, is much harsher than the romanticized
fiction. See, e.g., Anne-Marie O'Connor, Nightmare Voyage: Hellish Heat Kills Six of
Eight Dominicans Smuggled Into U.S. in Ship's Cargo Hold, OTroWA CIZEN, July 6,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library) (describing how six of eight stowaways in a
sealed freight container died after "pounding on the container and yelling, 'Let us
out. We're dying"); Stowaways SetFire in Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1988, at B9 ("Four
Dominican stowaways who were locked in the cargo hold of a container ship set a fire
early today to get the crew's attention .... ")
261 If the number of stowaways grew, thejustice Depprtmentor Congress might
try to curb the influx by further increasing the penalties on carriers. This should,
however, be avoided. If stowaways were granted greater rights, the period required
to process their asylum applications would increase and, as a result, carrier costs
would rise for the shipping companies that are responsible for the stowaway's
maintenance. Thus, enhanced rights for stowaways would translate into increased
costs for carriers independent of any additional penalties.
Furthermore, increased fines would not necessarily decrease the number of
stowaways boarding at foreign ports. In 1950, during the hearings on the INA,
Congress accepted this premise when it eliminated proposed INA § 273(e), which
sought to impose a $500 penalty against carriers for simply havinga stowaway aboard.
The Federation of American Shipping persuasively argued that their crews search the
vessels, that gangway watchers are on constant alert, and that, where possible,
shoreside gangway watchers and local police are also utilized. Furthermore, the
Federation argued that the companies are
responsible for the safekeeping of the stowaway until he is turned over to
proper authorities and ... must hire a guard to watch him. Even after a
stowaway is turned over to the proper authorities, his maintenance and
detention expenses are for the account of the company. If he requires
medical attention or hospitalization the company pays for it. The company
must arrange for his transportation if he is deported .... [Moreover i]t is,
and always will be, extremely difficult to prevent stowaways from boarding
a vessel and to locate them after they are aboard. Unfortunate individuals
... are seeking to escape from the unhappy circumstances ... [and b]eing
frequently without means, necessity has forced upon them the requirement
to devise and execute ingenious schemes to board and secrete themselves
on ships .... The fact that certain of these persons are able to board...
vessels is not evidence of a lack of diligence on the part of shipping
companies and their agents.
Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 171-72 (statement of Alfred U. Krebs, Counsel,
National Federation of American Shipping, Inc.); see alsoJarvis, supra note 4, at 31-33
(describing the American shipping industry's opposition to increased penalties for
ships with stowaways because the carriers were already taking "maximum precau-
tions").
A similar situation exists today. One captain who had five stowaways aboard
declared:
People tend to glamorize it, but this is an expensive and ongoing problem
for shipping companies in ports of all the Third World countries. We lock
the ship up tight while in port to minimize the hiding places. We hire local
police to guard the gangplanks. Then, after we're loaded and ready to go,
the standard operating procedure is to scour the ship from top to bottom.
We caught three older boys earlier that night. Then later we found a
348 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:285
support, however, as well as control over U.S. borders, can be
maintained through "a system capable of saying 'no' to the
unqualified-fairly, but firmly and expeditiously-while promptly
welcoming the meritorious applicant."262 The U.S. immigration
system should not compensate for the difficulties it has in removing
people by summarily screening out stowaway asylum seekers. They
are entitled to protection under U.S. and international law, and
should not have to bear the brunt of an immigration system in need
of repair.
If the United States implemented fairer and more thorough
procedures for dealing with stowaway asylum seekers, it could
pressure other countries to do the same. Almost all stowaways pass
through foreign ports before landing in the United States; these
other nations must share responsibility for such stowaways. The
United States should take the lead in drafting, signing, and
monitoring the implementation of an International Convention on
Stowaways. Ultimately, the granting of greater rights to stowaways
worldwide could lead to a decrease in the number of stowaways who
arrive at U.S. shores.
VI. DUTIES OF PROTECTING STOWAWAY ASYLUM SEEKERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The International Convention Relating to Stowaways
The only existing treaty on stowaways-the International
Convention Relating to Stowaways263 drafted in 1957-has not
come into force because only nine of the ten countries required
have ratified it.2 64 The Convention calls on masters of ships
flagged in states that are parties to the agreement to "deliver the
stowaway to the appropriate authority at the first port in a Contract-
ing State at which the ship calls after the stowaway is found."265
younger boy in a barrel on deck just as we were ready to sail.
McAleenan, supra note 248, at C1, C2.
262 Martin, supra note 99, at 1270.
265 International Convention Relating to Stowaways, Oct. 10, 1957, reprinted in 8
NAGENDRA SINGH, BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF
MERCHANT SHIPPING 1354 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter Stowaway Convention].
264 See M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, supra note 26, at 222-23. It is possible that
other countries have been hesitant to ratify this Convention and thereby be labelled
as the country that imposed new obligations on the nine previous parties, for the
Convention then would come into force.
265 Stowaway Convention, supra note 263, art. 2, para. 1, at 1355.
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This port state is to shelter the stowaway temporarily but can send
her back to her home country, back to the port where she boarded
the ship, back to the last port at which the vessel called before
arriving at this port state, or back to the country where the vessel
was flagged (in this decreasing order of preference).2 66 If the au-
thorities of the port state believe the stowaway would face persecu-
tion in a particular country, that potential destination must
automatically be eliminated.2 67 If no country is willing to accept
the stowaway, the flag state has the ultimate duty to do so.
2 68
Only Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Madagascar, Morocco,
Norway, Peru, and Sweden have ratified this treaty. 26 9 Brazil,
France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Portugal, Spain,
Switzerland, and Vatican City have signed the treaty but not ratified
it. 270  By ratifying the Convention, the Scandinavian countries-
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden-have arguably created a
regional custom to which they are bound under international
law.2 71  Furthermore, Germany, Greece, and Spain have also
ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.272 They
are bound by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention which states: "A
state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed that treaty ...
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty."
273
These countries are therefore obligated to uphold the goals of the
Stowaway Convention. These include the duties of countries to
refrain from sending stowaways to persecution, 274 of port states
266 See id. art. 3, paras. 1-4, at 1355.
267 See id. art. 5, para. 2, at 1356 ("As regards the application of the [Convention's]
provisions, "the Master and the appropriate authorities of the port of disembarkation
will take into account the reasons which may be put forward by the stowaway for not
being disembarked at or returned to those ports or States mentioned in this
Convention."); see also text accompanying note 266.
268 See id. art. 3, para. 4, at 1355.
269 See BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 26, at 223.
270 See id.
271 Customary international law is evidenced by the customs and practices of
states. For a practice to become customary law it must have the "general assent of
civilized nations." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900); see also Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (declaring that "civilized nations have
banded together to prescribe acceptable norms of international behavior"). Regional
custom arises when the countries of a specific geographic area assent to the same
international practice.
272 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
273 Id. art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
274 All of the signatory and ratifying countries of the Stowaway Convention, except
350 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:285
to offer temporary shelter to stowaways, and of flag states to bear
ultimate responsibility for stowaways who cannot be resettled
elsewhere.
Because only one country is needed for the Stowaway Conven-
tion to enter into force, the United States is in a position to create
international law simply by ratifying this Convention. The United
States should do so immediately so that stowaways could at least
receive protection from those countries who are parties to the
Convention. This would be significant because the Scandinavian
countries that have ratified the Convention are maritime states with
large fleets; stowaways would be protected aboard vessels flagged in
these party states, and these flag states would bear ultimate
responsibility for them. In conclusion, not only should the United
States ratify the Stowaway Convention, but it should also help
generate international consensus around the drafting of a more
comprehensive and effective treaty. Such a draft could be intro-
duced by a UNHCR Working Group, under U.N. auspices.
B. The Special Obligation of Port States
By placing the ultimate burden of accepting a stowaway on the
flag state, the Stowaway Convention does not offer an ideal solution.
About thirty-five percent of the world's merchant fleet is now
registered under flags of convenience. 275  Owners register their
vessels under these flags because of "low fees and taxation, together
with lower crew costs, and in some cases savings from not having to
comply with international safety standards."
276
Sending stowaways to flag countries would result in asylum
seekers being placed in countries to which they have a remote
link277 and would put a disproportionate burden on a small
Italy, Madagascar, and Brazil, have acceded to the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, without reservations. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59, Annex IV, at
86-87. India and Vatican City have not accepted either refugee treaty. See BOWMAN
& HARRIS, supra note 26, Seventh Cumulative Supp. 1990, at 121. The Stowaway
Convention does not discharge states of their duties under the other refugee
agreements; it specifically states that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not in
any way affect the power or obligation of a Contracting State to grant political
asylum." Stowaway Convention, supra note 263, art. 5, para. 3., at 1356 (emphasis
added).
275 Popular flag states include Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Somalia, and Vanuatu.
276 R.R. CHURcHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 206 (1988).
277 See Stowaway Asylum-Seekers, supra note 3, at 3 ("[A]Ithough the connection
between the stowaway asylum-seeker and the State of the first port of call may be
remote and coincidental, that person's link with the Flag State is usually even more
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number of countries. 278 A more practical solution is to have the
port state of the first port where a stowaway lands after being
discovered bear ultimate responsibility for the stowaway. Although
a vessel is considered the floating territory of the flag state, once
that vessel comes into a port, the port state can exercise full control
over immigration into its territory under the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 279 and the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.280 The UNHCR has
noted this exclusive jurisdiction of the port states over foreign
vessels within their territory, 2
81 as have commentators. 28 2
A stowaway should immediately be disembarked at the first port
of call upon the discovery of her presence. The port state can then
seek to resettle her elsewhere, depending on the particular case,
remote and quite fortuitous."). The port state is much more likely to be in the
geographic region of the stowaway's country of origin. Acceptance of responsibility
by the port state would coincide with the UNHCR's policy of favoring local
integration. It is easier for a refugee to adapt to an environment similar to her own.
278 See id. This problem of disproportionate burden has arisen in the context of
the debate over the Indochinese boat people. Maritime states such as Greece have
argued that "'the rescue ... at sea [program] should not impose flag-state
responsibility; that responsibility rested with all signatories of the Convention and
Protocol and the problem should be thoroughly re-examined with a view to an
equitable sharing of the burden.'" GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 203, at 90 (quoting
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/SR.319).
279 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
24, para. 1(a), 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220 ("In a zone of the high
seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to: (a) Prevent infringement of its... immigration... regulations within
its territory or territorial sea."). The contiguous zone is defined as the zone up to
twelve miles from the baseline. See id. art. 24, para. 2, 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516
U.N.T.S. at 220.
280 Sea Convention, supra note 46. This Convention states:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages
in any of the following activities:... (g) the loading or unloading of any...
person contrary to... immigration ... laws and regulations of the coastal
State.
Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 19, para. 2(g), 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
281 See Stowaway Asylum-Seekers, supra note 3, at 3 ("Coastal States enjoy absolute
jurisdiction over their territory .... Foreign ships in port cannot grant asylum on
board....").
282 Martin, supra note 99, at 179 (stating that aliens detained aboard ships in U.S.
territorial waters "plainly come within the jurisdiction of the United States in the
significant sense that this country's sovereign will ... can be applied to them
immediately, uncomplicated by any direct contest with another sovereign nation.");
see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 203, at 91 ("[I]t may be appropriate to emphasize
the responsibility of the first port of call, given the inescapable but internationally
relevant fact of the refugees' presence within the territory of the state.").
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after considering the stowaway's wishes28 3 and family connections
abroad. The port state, however, should bear ultimate responsibility
if the stowaway cannot be resettled. With this procedure in place,
the flag state would have the duty to treat a stowaway decently while
she remains on board the vessel, while the port state would have
responsibility for granting asylum to a stowaway fleeing persecution.
If a port state requires a ship's master to detain a stowaway "on
board and travel on to the next port of call" or leaves it to "the flag
state to assume responsibility where the next port of call is
unacceptable," 284 it could be considered a breach of the 1951
U.N. Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the Torture Convention.
As one commentator has argued convincingly that
[i]f the flag state refuses to accept any responsibility for resettlement
and if the ship's next port of call is in a country in which the stowaway
asylum-seekers' life or freedom may be threatened, then the practical
effect of refusal of entry is refoulement. The nominal authority of the
flag state to require diversion to a safe port, which would anyway be
controversial where a charter party was involved, can hardly be
considered a practical alternative, or 'last opportunity', to avoid
refoulement. The paramount consideration remains the refugee status
of those on board; a refusal to take account of their claims, either on
the specious basis that they have not 'entered' state territory or on the
(disputed) ground that they are the responsibility of the flag or any
other state, would not suffice to avoid liability for breach of the
principle of non-refoulement.
285
Because a port state's inaction could result in the stowaway being
sent to persecution, any new treaty relating to stowaways should
mandate that the port state bear ultimate responsibility for a
stowaway.
286
283 See Refugees Without an Asylum County, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 30th
Sess., No. 15, § h(iii) (1979), in U.N. HCR EXECUTIVE COMM., CONCLUSIONS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 31, 32 (1988) [hereinafter Conclusion No.
15] (stating that "[t]he intentions of the asylum-seeker as regards the country in which
he wishes to request asylum should as far as possible be taken into account").
284 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 203, at 85.
285 Id. at 86-87.
286 This system would avoid a worst-case scenario in which vessel captains, feeling
responsible for the fate of the stowaway, try to rid themselves of the stowaway to
avoid censure by their employers. A similar tragic situation has, in fact, arisen in the
South China Sea, where the Thai and U.S. governments set up an anti-piracy program
in 1981 that operates in conjunction with an international program run. by the
UNHCR. As authorities began to arrest and prosecute pirates, they also began to
note a horrifying development. Although the number of attacks declined sharply,
"more of the pirate attacks than ever before seemed intent, not just on robbery and
1991] OBLIGATIONS TOWARD STOWAWAYASYLUM SEEKERS 353
Problems could arise, however, with making port states
responsible for stowaways; many of the first port-of-call countries at
which stowaways arrive are unwilling to assist them. Few of these,
nations are parties to the Stowaway Convention and many are not
even parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol.
Stowaways ultimately granted asylum in the United States are known
to have been previously rejected by Singapore, India, Thailand,
South Korea, Japan, Bahrain, Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and
Saudi Arabia.2 87  Most Chinese stowaways who have departed
Hong Kong ports during the past two years go through Singapore,
Taiwan, and/or Japan before their arrival in the United States.
2 88
The countries through which stowaways and other asylum seekers
pass are generally not very receptive toward them.28 9 However,
mayhem, but total massacre." Court Robinson, Pirate Attacks on Vietnamese Refugees
Grow More Vicious, WoRLD REFUGEE SURV. (U.S. Comm. for Refugees) 58,58 (1989).
Experts have suggested that "with the growing sophistication of investigation
techniques, coupled with higher rates of arrests and convictions, pirates try to be sure
to leave no witnesses." Id.
An equally grisly situation could arise if captains felt they would be penalized by
their shipping companies (who would be responsible if the flag state had to accept the
stowaway) for not having discovered the stowaway before leaving port. One would
only hope that such action would be deterred by the humaneness of the captains or
by the threat of criminal prosecution if authorities became aware of an incident.
While those who commit piracy against the boat people are a wretched group,
generally, captains of vessels with stowaways are civilized people who have behaved
properly in the past.
287 SeeJohnson, supra note 212, at B4 (noting that stowaways were denied asylum
in Singapore, India, Thailand, South Korea, andJapan); U.S. Denies Stowaway Asylum,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1989, at P2 (noting that a stowaway, Tuan Van Nguyen, was
denied asylum in Singapore, Bahrain, Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia). Despite initial rejection by the U.S. State Department, Mr. Nguyen later was
granted asylum by the INS, which overruled the State Department. See Vietnam
Stowaway Granted Asylum, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989, at A27.
288 See, e.g., Denn, supra note 212, at All ("The crew tried to leave the [two
Chinese stowaways] at other ports in Taiwan andJapan but 'they refused to accept
the ladies' .... ).
289 See, e.g., Chinese Stowaways Indictedfor Breach of Immigration Law, KYODO NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("Prosecutors ... indicted
15 Chinese stowaways on charges of violating immigration regulations."); Johnson,
supra note 212, at B4 (reporting that, after being refused entry into Japan, three
stowaways jumped into Japanese waters in an act of desperation and two of their
bodies were later recovered); Nicholas D. Kristof, Taiwan Accused in Deaths of 25
Refugees at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at 21 (reporting that 25 Chinese suffocated
during forcible repatriation to China while locked in crowded cabins); Nicholas D.
Kristof, Taiwan Is Ambivalent on Mainland Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1991, at A12
(reporting that thousands of mainland Chinese have been deported from Taiwan);
Molly Moore, Philippine Demands Strand Refugees on U.S. NaVy Ship at Subic, WASH.
POST, June 12, 1990, at A20 ("Philippine officials ... have announced that they will
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an international consensus generated by the drafting and prospec-
tive ratification of a more effective stowaway convention could serve
to modify the uninviting policies of these first port-of-call countries.
This would be a welcome shift because it is more practical for port
states, rather than flag states, to bear responsibility for stowaway
asylum seekers arriving at their shores.
C. The Role of the UNHCR
Given the problems in obtaining asylum for stowaways in port
states, the UNHCR should become involved immediately after a
stowaway is discovered. A new stowaway convention should impose
a duty on shipmasters to notify the UNHOR of a stowaway's
presence, and a duty on port states to notify UNHCR authorities
upon a stowaway's arrival. The UNHCR could then monitor the
situation to ensure that stowaways are humanely treated aboard
vessels, as required by international law.
290
Notification would also allow the UNHCR to monitor asylum
adjudication in the port states, and if those states refused to grant
asylum to a stowaway, the UNHCR could intervene to try to find a
country that would grant asylum. As the UNHCR Executive
Committee noted, "[i]f necessary, UNHCR should be requested to
assist in finding a durable solution."291 The Committee has also
concluded that "States should give favourable consideration to
accepting, at the request of the Office of the [UNHCR], a limited
number of refugees who cannot find asylum in any country."
292
not allow U.S. warships-or other vessels-to leave refugees on their shores unless the
country to which the ship is registered can guarantee the individuals will be resettled
elsewhere within six months."); REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Washington,
D.C.),June 22, 1990, at 5 ("The government of the Philippines has refused to allow
101 Vietnamese boat people aboard a U.S. naval supply ship in Subic Bay to
disembark."); Steven R. Weisman, New Indignities for Refugees injapan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1989, at AS (noting that arrivals of Chinese and Vietnamese boat people have
"rekindled the debate about how far Japan should go to fulfill its international
obligations"). Interestingly, both Japan and the Philippines are parties to the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 59,
annex IV.
2O See MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 15, 553, 667 (4th ed. 1985)
(stating that a vessel owes a stowaway the duty "to afford him humane treatment
while he ... remains on board"); see also Buchanan v. Stanships Inc., 744 F.2d 1070,
1074 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that stowaways are normally due humane
treatment), rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 265 (1988).
291 Stowaway Asylum-Seekers, supra note 3, at 6.
212 Conclusion No. 15, supra note 283, § 1.
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While the UNHCR now intervenes on an ad hoc basis to find
asylum countries for stowaways,293 it would be able to do so on
a more systematic basis if shipmasters and port states were obligated
to inform the High Commissioner about stowaways. A consistent
program of intervention would not unduly burden the local offices
of the UNHCR because they are already involved in many stowaway
cases through their monitoring of stowaway arrivals and interview-
ing of stowaways aboard vessels in port states.
29
Another concern the UNHCR could address is the fate of
stowaways who are caught by ship captains prior to leaving foreign
ports. If a stowaway is discovered while the vessel is still in port,
she will usually be forced off and handed over to authorities who
will presumably treat her as a defector. 295 A new stowaway con-
vention might impose a duty on shipmasters to contact the UNHCR,
or at least a non-governmental organization, before the stowaway is
forcibly removed from her vessel. Implementing this requirement
would be difficult, however, because stowaways might be discovered
just as the vessel is about to leave port, when the crew typically
29 See Iraqi Deserter Winds Up in Brazil, UPI, Feb. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library (recounting that stowaway asylum seeker in landed who Rio dejaneiro
was "expected to be turned over to the Brazil office of the [UNHCR]"); Johnson,
supra note 212, at B4; McAleenan, supra note 248, at 2; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 203, at 85-86 (detailing UNHCR intervention in two cases involving stowaways
in Australia, after Australia demanded a resettlement guarantee in one case and the
UNHCR's promise to use its best efforts to effect resettlement in a third country in
the other).
294 These activities are especially prevalent in Japan. See supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
295 See MEDVID INCIDENT, supra note 66, at 18-22,66-68 (speculating that after the
Ukrainian seaman was forcibly returned to his vessel and later beaten by other
crewmen, he was drugged before being re-released to U.S. authorities), see also
McAleenan, supra note 248, at 2 ("[W]e found a younger boy in a barrel on deck just
as we were ready to sail. He was taken off and greeted rather roughly, I'm afraid.
The soldiers were banging him around pretty good as they took him away."). One
Ethiopian boy who remained on that vessel as a stowaway claimed that "[t ]he last time
the army talked with [him] was after he had been caught trying to sneak aboard a
ship." The reporter noted that the boy's "legs are a patchwork of scars from being
wrapped in chains for several weeks." Id. Another stowaway child who made it to the
United States on that ship was forced to "'knee-walk' for a mile or more on the
blistering sand" by soldiers as punishment for trying to sneak aboard an Italian
freighter in port. Id.
One young Ethiopian stowaway stated that "[pleople who have attempted to flee
Ethiopia as stowaways and are caught often disappear .... When they disappear,
they are often killed." YoungStowaways Ask Asylumfrom Ethiopia, supra note 44, at B2.
Such harsh treatment of prospective stowaways is of grave concern, given that
attempting to emigrate is a crime in many countries. See HURST HANNUM, THE RiGHT
To LFAvE AND RETURN iN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 51 (1987).
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works on a tight schedule and UNHCR personnel may be unavail-
able. In sum, the UNHCR should be notified of stowaways once
they are discovered aboard vessels on the high seas so it can assist
them in finding asylum countries. Where feasible, the UNHCR
should also be notified of the existence of stowaways that are
ejected from vessels in the ports where the stowaways boarded so
that it can assist these asylum seekers as well.
D. Heightened Duties Toward Child Stowaway Asylum Seekers
One class of stowaways merits particular attention: stowaway
children. These asylum seekers deserve special care from the
international community and special consideration in any newly
drafted stowaway convention. The UNHCR has repeatedly
highlighted the special situation of refugee children.2 96  One
captain's comments about the five children from Ethiopia who
stowed away on his vessel demonstrate their precarious situation:
They are nice kids, but stowaways-especially kid stowaways-are a
supreme pain. There's simply no place, no provisions for housing
them, no really good way to take care of them .... The paperwork,
crew overtime, cables back and forth, putting attorneys to work-
all that has already cost the company several thousand dollars....
You have to lock them up, you have to feed them, you have to
coddle them. It's a mess.
297
Nonetheless, this captain noted that "I guess I'd not like to see
them sent back. There's not much family life there anymore. I
think only two of them... still have any kind of family intact. The
others are essentially homeless. They have fled a pretty horrible
scene." 298 The plight of these children brings to mind the Child-
296 See Refugee Children, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 38th Sess., No. 47, § c
(1987), in U.N. HCR EXECUTIVE COMM., CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 105, 105 (1988) (reiterating "the widely-recognized
principle that children must be among the first to receive protection and assistance")
(emphasis omitted); Report of the Fortieth Session of the Executive Committee, U.N. HCR
Executive Comm., 40th Sess., 1 26, § h, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/737 (1989) (calling upon
"UNHCR to promote the best possible legal protection of unaccompanied minors").
297 McAleenan, supra note 248, at 2 (quoting Bill Weiss, Captain of the
grainfreighter, the Galveston Bay).298 Id. For other accounts of child stowaway asylum seekers, see Young Stowaways
Ask Asylum From Ethiopia, supra note 44, at B2 ("One hot evening this summer, two
Ethiopian boys fled their homeland. By moonlight, they dived into the Red Sea,
swam to a ship anchored offshore and climbed aboard."); Three Somali Stowaways
Apply for Political Asylum in Tanzania, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP., Jan. 10, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library ("Dar es Salaam Contacts are underwaybetween the
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ren's Defense Fund motto: "Dear God, be good to me. The sea is
so wide and my boat is so small."29 But as the captain's com-
ments convey, the children's problem, ironically, is that their vessels
are so huge that they pose dangers to stowaways.
3 00
Children asylum seekers are given special recognition in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child30 1 which mandates that,
with respect to a child who is seeking refugee status, signatories
shall provide "co-operation in any efforts by the United Nations...
UN High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR, the national shipping agency company
and the owners of a Greek vessel docked at Dar es Salaam port to determine the fate
of three Somali teenagers discovered on board the cargo ship."); see also Treatment
Protested, supra note 235, at 16 (reporting that a teenage boy arrived in Miami among
a group of Haitian stowaways that was chained and caged aboard a cargo vessel);
supra notes 167-68 and infra note 324 (describing incident in which two Ethiopian
teenagers were sent from the United States to Gibraltar, even after theyjumped ship
twice).
299 CDF REP. (Children's Def. Fund, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1989, at 1; see also
DAVID ADAM, THE EDGE OF GLORY: PRAYERS IN THE CELTIC TRADITION 33 (1985)
(reciting similar language in the prayer of the Breton fishermen).
300 Among UNHCR personnel, accounts of stowaways crushed or suffocated by
cargoes abound. See, e.g., INS Grants Refuge to Vietnamese Stowaway, UPI REPORT, Oct.
31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (commenting on a stowaway who had
made a plywood seat and lashed himselfjust above the ship's propeller, the captain
noted that "ifI filled the ballast he would be dead, ffI didn't stop in Singapore [and
run a lifeboat exercise during which the stowaway was spotted] he would be dead");
McAleenan, supra note 248, at 2 (noting that five stowaway children who were hiding
in a locker for an anchor chain were particularly fortunate because "this particular
anchor was not in use, or [else] they would have been 'scrambled eggs'"); Stowaways
Killed, USA TODAY, June 20, 1990, at 4A (reporting that 11 stowaways hidden in a
cargo hold were killed by "a pesticide that was sprayed on the vessel's cargo of
cocoa"); Two Stowaways Recount 3 Days of Terror in Freight Container, Cm. TRIB., July
7, 1991, at C19 (relating incident in which six stowaways suffocated in sealed freight
container).
301 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456
[hereinafter Child Convention] (adopted without vote by U.N. General Assembly,
G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/
25 (1989)). At least seventy countries have now ratified it. See The Rights of the Child,
HUM. RTS. NEWSL. (Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switz.),Jan. 1991, at 3; see also
id. at 2 (comment of Philip Alston, Professor of Law, that the Convention is uniquely
comprehensive in that it "brings together, in one document, a statement of the rights
of the child that were previously to be found only by searching through a score of
different instruments in diverse areas such asjuvenilejustice, refugee law, humanitari-
an law, social welfare law, etc."); Gary B. Melton, Socialization in the Global Community:
Respectfor the Dignity of Children, 46 AM. PSYcHOL. 66, 70 (1991) ("The Convention
is the first official bill of rights of children with a coherent, comprehensive vision of
children's policy.'); cf. Cynthia Price Cohen & Hedwin Naimark, United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Individual Rights Concepts and Their Significance
for Social Scientists, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 60, 60 (1991) ("Although the breadth of the
Convention's protections is exceptional, what is especially interesting and innovative
is the ultimate picture that the text draws of the child as an individual.").
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to protect and assist such a child and to trace the parents or other
members of the family.., in order to obtain information necessary
for reunification with his or her family" and if family members
cannot be found, the State must afford the child30 2 pro-
tection.
303
The preferred solution for child asylum seekers, under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, is family reunification. The
UNHCR supports this policy and has been actively implementing it
with respect to unaccompanied minors in Indochina.30 4 Serious
problems, however, can arise when the child expresses a fear of
persecution while the child's family, and sometimes the government
of the country of origin, insist on her return and vow that the child
will not face persecution.30 5 The government may be falsely
assuring the international community of the child's safety while
coercing the parents into asking for the return of their child by
threatening the remaining family members. If the child comes from
302 Under the Convention, all persons under the age of 18 are considered children
"unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Child
Convention, supra note 301, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459.
303 Id. art. 22, 1 2, 28 I.L.M at 1465 (erroneously printed under art. 24). For a
correct reprinting of this article, see BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., BASIc DOCUMENTs
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 498,503-04 (2d ed. 1990). Child asylum
seekers also are protected by the more general provisions of the Convention. Article
2 requires that state parties "respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present
Convention to each child within theirjurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child's status .... " Child Convention, supra note 301, art. 2,1 1,
28 I.L.M. at 1459; see also Ilene Cohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: What
It Means for Children in War, 3 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 100, 106 (1991) (maintaining that
"UNHCR protection officers can and should assert [claims to all Child Convention
rights] on behalf of refugee children").
304 See Christine Mougne, The Tide is Turning, REFUGEES, Dec. 1990, at 25 (stating
that a Special Committee that decides on the cases of unaccompanied children has
"placed particular emphasis on the principle of family reunification" and that
hundreds of children have been returned to their families in Vietnam under UNHCR
supervision). The UNHCR performs follow-up visits to the child's home to be
assured of her well-being. See id.
305 See, e.g., Young Stowaways Ask Asylum from Ethiopia, supra note 44, at B2,
(reporting that two stowaway children insisted that they feared for their lives if
returned to Ethiopia, even though their parents "had not indicated any fear that the
boys would be harmed if they were returned" and a representative of the Ethiopian
government had insisted that no punitive measures would be taken against them
because, in his words, "[t]hey are small children, after all"). Reassuring statements
by government officials can be troubling, particularly if the children come from a
country like Ethiopia, whose government, until recently, forcibly conscripted children
at an extremely young age. See generally 200,000 Youths Said to Be in World's Armies,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1988, § 1, at 8 ("The world's armies include about 200,000
youths, some as young as 12 years of age .... ").
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a country with a poor human rights record, states should give
specialized attention to the child's case. Furthermore, a party state
must consider the child's opinion of her situation.3 0 6 To abide by
these requirements, the state must disembark a stowaway child and
trace her family to determine the best solution to her plight.
Stowaway children should also be granted at least temporary
haven at the first port of call because children unaccompanied by
parents may be reticent or may not be mature enough to express a
fear of persecution. Effective investigation of the children's
situation clearly requires disembarkation. One expert who treated
children who had been kidnapped and recruited by Mozambican
rebels when they were as young as six years old observed that these
children were "psychologically numbed-often speechless, seemingly
incapable of showing any kind of emotion other than a kind of
unnerving, wait and see, stoicism."3 0 7 These observations again
raise the concern of asylum seeker reticence among those that have
witnessed and experienced horror, a concern that is heightened
when children are involved. The findings suggest that stowaway
children must be disembarked immediately so they can tell their
stories in a less intimidating forum to officials aware of their
precarious psychological state. Other children may be too young to
articulate a fear of persecution. In such cases, the UNHCR has
urged that "objective factors such as the situation prevailing in the
country of origin and the circumstances of family members there
should be accorded greater weight."
3 0 8
306 See id. art. 12, 28 I.L.M. at 1461 ("(I) States Parties shall assure to the child
who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely
in all matters affecting the child .... (2) For this purpose, the child shall in
particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in anyjudicial and administrative
proceedings .... ").
307 Neil Boothby, Living in the War Zone, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1989 IN
REVIEW (U.S. Comm. for Refugees) 40,41 (1990). Arn Chron Pond, a child during
the Pol Pot years in Cambodia who was accorded refugee status by the United States,
poignantly makes this point:
I have come to realize that I am alive again. I am not just alive because
bullets failed to reach my brain. I am notjust alive because a stick missed
my skull .... I am alive really only because finally and painfully after these
years, I know that I can love again. I can feel the suffering of others, not
just my own.
The World Seemed Strange, Silent and Slow to Move, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1987 IN
REVIEW (U.S. Comm. for Refugees) 13, 13 (1988); see also Margaret McCallin, The
Convention on the Rights of the Child as an Instrument to Address the Psychological Needs
of Refugee Children, 3 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 82, 90 (1991) (describing the psychological
impact of traumatic experiences on refugee children).
308 Arthur E. Dewey, Refugee Children: Halfthe World's Refugees, REFUGEES,June
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Those countries, such as the United States, that are not parties
to the Convention s°9 are still obliged to protect child asylum
seekers because of their obligations under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol.31 0  Furthermore, these countries must recog-
nize that "the Convention will rapidly-if it has not already-become
the universal benchmark against which the performance of all
countries with respect to the well-being of their children will be
judged."3 1 1 The Convention is therefore in the process of becom-
ing customary international law, which all nations are obliged to fol-
low.
3 12
The United States, in particular, also has special obligations to
child asylum seekers that have been imposed through common law.
At least one federal court has determined that the "limited
understanding and decision-making ability" of children and the
"inherently coercive nature of INS processing require that the
children be given some assistance in understanding their
rights."3 13 The court mandated that the INS ensure that children
in its custody communicate with family members, friends, or with
"an organization found on the free legal services list."3 14 These
special services are equally important in the child stowaway context,
1988, at 16, 17.
309 The United States has signed but not ratified the Convention. It has argued
that it cannot ratify the Convention because "it cannot see how to make its states
comply," while Great Britain, which also has not ratified the Convention, has stated
that it has "trouble conforming to the convention's articles over immigration policy."
Caroline Moorehead, Child Rights Campaign Starts Timidly; Rights and Wrongs, THE
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 4, 1991, at 12, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Moorehead
declared that "[tihe whole process [of implementing the Convention] becomes
something of a mockery when apparently liberal democracies do not take part, while
repressive regimes do." Id.
s10 See Cohn, supra note 303, at 107 (noting that "all international treaties in force
for a given state must be read together for maximum protection" of child asylum
seekers).
3" The Rights of the Child, supra note 301, at 4; see also UNICEF, THE WORLD
SUMMIT FOR CHILDREN 12 (1990) ("It is expected that the standards set by the
Convention will become the point of reference for everyone concerned with the
health, development and protection of children."); see also McCallin, supra note 307,
at 83 (asserting that the Child Convention "represents world consensus on the
minimum set of rights which governments must guarantee to children').
312 See supra note 271.
313 Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 664 (C.D. Cal. 1985); see also Orantes-
Hernandezv. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488,1509 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (including unaccompa-
nied minors as a category of immigrants deserving enhanced protection), afl'd sub
nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
314 Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 670.
1991] OBLIGATIONS TOWARD STOWAWAYASYLUM SEEKERS 361
and if they are not feasible, immigration officials should at least be
obligated to assist the child stowaway in contacting the UNHCR.
In sum, with the environment of renewed international
commitment to children's rights,3 15 port states have become
bound by customary international law and by treaty to shelter
stowaway children, to assist them with family reunification and, if
necessary, to grant them asylum. Countries, such as the United
States, that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child should do so. Furthermore, any draft of a new stowaway
convention should include provisions that recognize the special
situation of stowaway children and mandate that nations provide
special assistance to these asylum seekers.
CONCLUSION
To bring its policy regarding stowaways into compliance with its
obligations under the 1967 Protocol and the Refugee Act of 1980,
the U.S.Justice Department should amend its regulations regarding
stowaways to require automatic disembarkation of all stowaways.
Once they are disembarked, stowaways should not only have a right
to an interview with the local district director and an asylum officer,
if appropriate, but also the right to an exclusion hearing before an
immigration judge, if asylum is denied at the district director level.
To implement these changes, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(1) should be
amended to read: "(1) If the alien is on a vessel or other convey-
ance, she shall be promptly removed from the conveyance."
Removal from the vessel should not hinge, as it currently does, on
whether an alien "makes [her] fear of persecution known to an
immigration inspector or other official making an examination on
the conveyance."3 16 After removal, a stowaway should have the
right to an interview with the district director, and the opportunity
to file for asylum. If a stowaway alleged a fear of persecution to the
district director, she would then have the right to have her applica-
tion reviewed by an asylum officer, as is currently required. 17
315 The World Summit for Children was held at the United Nations on Sept. 30,
1990. "For an entire day the chiefs rumbled and rhapsodized over the plight of...
children." Samuel Francis, Son of New World Order, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1990, at
G2. One can only hope that "[a] successful World Summit [will] make the 1990s the
decade in which the shameful large-scale deaths and widespread malnutrition of the
world's children are consigned to history." UNICEF, GIVING CHILDREN A FUTURE:
THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR CHILDREN 9 (1990).
316 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(0(1) (1991).
317 See id. § 253.1(0(2).
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Mandatory disembarkation would not translate into an assumption
that all stowaways are asylum seekers. 18 If the stowaway did not
allege a fear of persecution once disembarked and given adequate
time to relate her history (with the assistance of an interpreter) to
the district director and/or asylum officer, she could then be
returned to the custody of -the shipping line and removed from the
United States.
The right to appeal a negative asylum decision at the district
director level, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4), should also be amended to
read:
(4) A decision denying asylum to an alien crewman or stowaway,
but not an alien temporarily excluded under section 235(c) of this
chapter, may be appealed directly to a special inquiry officer
(immigration judge). Such appeal must be filed within ten days of
the asylum officer's decision. From a decision of a special inquiry
officer denying asylum, such alien may then file, within ten days
of the special inquiry officer's decision, an appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
Currently, the regulation denies stowaway asylum seekers the
intermediate level of appeal to an immigration judge3
19
Finally, the regulations should be amended to enable full
UNHCR participation. Presently, under 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a), "[a]n
application for asylum or withholding of deportation shall not be
disclosed except as permitted by this section, or at the discretion of
the Attorney General, without the written consent of the appli-
cant."320  The section enumerating the exceptions to the §
208.6(a) disclosure limitations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c), should be
amended to include the UNHCR among the exceptions. The new
8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c)(3) could read: "(c) This section shall not apply
to any disclosure to: (3) the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR)." This change would be a recognition of the
fact that the UNHCR is an inter-governmental organization with
which the United States has agreed to cooperate on asylum matters.
The current rules incorrectly categorize the UNHCR as a non-
governmental organization.
.18 Clearly, not all stowaways are meritorious asylum applicants; some are outright
criminals. See, e.g., Tucked Above a Rudder: 2 Men and Cocaine, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29,
1991, at Al (reporting that police divers in the New York harbor discovered two
stowaways with 366 pounds of cocaine in the air pocket of the rudder compartment
on an oil tanker). Other stowaways are simply immigrants.
319 See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4) (1991).
320 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (1991).
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Congress and the Justice Department must realize that the
current procedures for stowaway asylum seekers violate internation-
al law. The Justice Department should be pressured into action.
While the Attorney General has the authority to "establish such
regulations... as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority
under the provisions" 21 of the INA, these regulations clearly
"cannot conflict with either the letter or the spirit of the Act unless
[they] ha[ve] been authorized by some specific statutory direc-
tive."3 22 Congress has not authorized the Attorney General to
distinguish among asylum seekers by according different groups of
asylum seekers different rights; on the contrary, under INA § 208,
the Attorney Genieral is ordered to establish equal procedures for
all asylum seekers "irrespective of such alien's status."323 If the
Justice Department is unwilling to implement the above-suggested
rules, Congress should intervene and amend the INA to accord
similar rights to all stowaway asylum seekers.
If neither Congress nor the Attorney General amends the
procedures for stowaways to require automatic disembarkation, the
regulations should at least be amended to require that an asylum
officer conduct the shipboard screening interview, accompanied by
a qualified INS interpreter. The regulations should also require
shipmasters to notify the UNHCR of a stowaway's presence, and
should allow attorneys appointed by the UNHCR immediate access
to the stowaway. Section 253.1(f)(1) could read:
(1) If the alien is on a vessel or other conveyance, an asylum
officer and INS interpreter shall conduct a screening interview of
such alien. If an attorney sent by UNHCR is ready and willing to
assist the stowaway, she shall be permitted to board the vessel
along with the asylum officer and interpreter. If the alien makes
a fear of persecution known to the asylum officer, she shall be
promptly removed from the conveyance.
The previous suggestions for amending 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(4),
regarding the right to appeal asylum decisions, and 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.6(c), regarding release of information about asylum applicants
to the UNHCR, would still apply in the above alternative. In this
situation, an additional section requiring notification of the UNHCR
by shipmasters, in addition to their present duty to notify the INS
321 INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
s2 Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated
without opinion, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
323 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
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under 8 C.F.R. §§ 231.1(a), 251.1(a), would have to be added to 8
C.F.R. § 253.1. At the same time, it would be helpful if the UNHOR
facilitated the task of the pro bono attorney by releasing documents
to the attorney prior to the stowaway's arrival. To safeguard the
stowaway's privacy interest, the UNHCR could secure a written
agreement from the attorney regarding the use of the information.
With respect to all of the above alternatives to mandatory
disembarkation, if the Attorney General does not implement them,
Congress could again implement similar requirements by statute.
If the United States refuses to implement any of the above sugges-
tions by statute or regulation, its cursory treatment of stowaways will
continue to be in violation of international and domestic law. By
forcing the stowaway to languish aboard the vessel and ultimately
possibly sending her back to persecution, the United States would
be directly responsible for her fate. A U.S. policy that accords
stowaways rights equivalent to those of other asylum seekers would
enable the United States to take the lead in policy changes toward
stowaways on an international level.
If the United States implemented fair procedures for stowaways,
it could then organize a draft committee for a new stowaway
convention under the auspices of the United Nations. It would be
most practical for such a convention to rest ultimate responsibility
for a stowaway with the port state, not the flag state. Furthermore,
such a convention should include a provision mandating special
protection for stowaway children, and another section calling for all
shipmasters to notify the UNHCR whenever a stowaway is discov-
ered. In the interim, the United States could take the lead in
protecting stowaways in the international arena by ratifying the 1957
International Convention Relating to Stowaways; with a tenth
ratifying country, this Convention would go into effect and
stowaways would have at least some protection internationally.
If the Justice Department shirks its duties, it will have to cope
with the damage to its public image when a stowaway is unjustifiably
expelled, or manages to get off the vessel through habeas proceed-
ings or by swimming ashore. Attempting to justify to both the
public and Congress why a stowaway was expelled to face persecu-
tion or drowned while attempting to swim ashore, would be more
administratively burdensome than simply letting stowaways off their
vessels, especially since shipping companies, not the U.S. govern-
ment, must pay for a stowaway's detention. The media is always
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quick to learn of a stowaway's plight,3 24 and members of Congress
are very sympathetic to stowaways imprisoned on their vessels.
3 25
Furthermore, if a stowaway is returned to persecution or dies,
Congress would not hesitate to investigate
3 26
In sum, according stowaways greater rights is not only required
by international and domestic law, but is also a wise policy decision.
Those who would hesitate to grant stowaways greater rights must
recall that the very act of stowing away is a desperate move; the
324 When a teenage Ethiopian stowawayjumped ship, for the second time, onjuly
4,1990 in Morehead City, North Carolina and attempted to swim four miles to shore,
the local news immediately reported his story. He was missing for two days and
presumed drowned, but luckily, after he had swum two miles, he managed to hoist
himself onto the anchor of a U.S. Navy vessel. The U.S. authorities simply returned
him to his vessel. Because this vessel never made it into port, the stowaway child
headed off with the vessel to the next port of call, Gibraltar. See supra notes 167-68.
A hauntingly similar situation arose this summer when two stowaway asylum seekers
"jumped into the ocean about a mile from Miami Beach... and tried to swim to
shore. [They] were returned to the ship from [INS] custody and were chained to the
deck .... As news of their treatment spread in Miami's Haitian-American
community, a crowd gathered at the docks to jeer officials." See Treatment Protested,
supra note 235, at 16.
In another incident, a television reporter in New Orleans
received a tip that 16 Jamaican stowaways had been hosed down in their
cells by harbor police on a night when it was 40 degrees. Several had to be
hospitalized for chills and fever. After [the reporter's] report, the FBI
began investigating. When it was learned the stowaways were to be shipped
back to Jamaica, [the reporter] chartered a helicopter and found the barge
carrying the stowaways downriver. After calls to authorities, the barge was
stopped and the stowaways taken into custody. A federal grand jury [was]
investigating the incident.
Local TVJournalism; SpecialReport, INFORMATION AccEss Co., Aug. 26, 1985, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library. The barge was "intercepted by agents of the [FBI], the
Coast Guard, and the INS" and the incident led to the Lynch litigation, described
supra note 243.
325 See David Lyons & Lizette Alvarez, Haitians Lose Appeal to Stay, MIAMI HERALD,
July 30, 1991, at 2B (reporting that allegations of mistreatment of several stowaways
"prompted U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., to ask U.S. Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh to investigate the incident in Miami, as well a similar one in Tampa.
Graham stated that '[t]he actions of both ships' crews that resulted in Haitians being
shackled, chained and caged are despicable.'"); Vietnam Stowaway Granted Asylum,
supra note 287, at A27 (reporting that, after being denied asylum in several ports, a
stowaway who had landed in Providence, Rhode Island was granted asylum by the INS
"after lobbying by Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and other members of the Rhode
Island congressional delegation"). In another incident, staff members in Sen.Jesse
Helms's office assisted the author duringJuly 1990 in locating an attorney willing to
assist the two Ethiopian stowaways on their vessel near the Morehead City port. See
supra notes 167-68.
326 The myriad hearings concerning the forcible return of the seaman Medvid
attest to this assertion. See supra notes 66-67, 122.
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image of a stowaway detained aboard an enormous vessel, moving
hopefully from port to port, yet being denied entry at each stop (as
well as perhaps ultimately being returned to persecution) should
provide sufficient motivation for action.
